Evaluation of the Conduct of Cessation of Violence

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Country/entity: Indonesia
Aceh
Region: Asia and Pacific
Agreement name: Evaluation of the Conduct of Cessation of Violence
Date: 4 Apr 2001
Agreement status: Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement: Yes
Agreement/conflict level: Intrastate/intrastate conflict
Indonesian Conflicts (1976 - )
Aceh Conflict (1976 - )
After a decade of increasing grievances against the centralist tendencies of the Suharto-government, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) started a military campaign in 1976 for the independence of the province in the far northeast of the Indonesian archipelago. After near defeat in 1979, GAM regained strength with Libyan support and the heaviest fighting occurred during the late 1980s when the Indonesian military intensified its violent counter-insurgency policies. The devastating tsunami in December 2004 effectively destroyed Aceh’s infrastructure and severely reduced the operational capabilities of GAM. This weakening led to a signed peace agreement in August 2005, facilitated by the Finish NGO CMI Peace Negotiations.

Indonesia-Moluccas Conflict (1999-2002)
The fall of Suharto in 1997 sparked off a number of conflicts across Indonesia. In the Moluccas region, the administrative division was divided into Moluccas and North Moluccas, thereby exacerbating a conflict characterised by communal and sectarian divisions. In part these divisions were a result of an official government transmigration programme running from late 1960s onwards that spurred conflict over resources, including land. Faith-based militias were generally responsible for the fighting from 1999 until 2002, including Laskar Jihad, and human rights abuses were committed by both sides. Opportunistic crime was also responsible for of the violence. The military campaign by Lashkar Islam was aimed to displacing Christian residents. One such event was the expulsion of the Christian residents of the Banda Islands in April 1999. The conflict ended with the signing of the Malino II Accord on 13 February 2002.
Stage: Ceasefire/related
Conflict nature: Government/territory
Peace process: Indonesia-Aceh peace process
Parties: Republic of Indonesia JSCM, KB. Pol. Drs. Ridhwan Karim,
GAM-JSCM, Tgk. Nashiruddin bin Ahmed
Third parties: Witnessed by Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Description: -

Agreement document: ID_010410_Evaluation of the Conduct of Cessation of Violence.pdf (opens in new tab) | Download PDF

Groups

Children/youth: No specific mention.
Disabled persons: No specific mention.
Elderly/age: No specific mention.
Migrant workers: No specific mention.
Racial/ethnic/national group: No specific mention.
Religious groups: No specific mention.
Indigenous people: No specific mention.
Other groups: No specific mention.
Refugees/displaced persons: No specific mention.
Social class: No specific mention.

Gender

Women, girls and gender: No specific mention.
Men and boys: No specific mention.
LGBTI: No specific mention.
Family: No specific mention.

State definition

Nature of state (general): No specific mention.
State configuration: No specific mention.
Self determination: No specific mention.
Referendum: No specific mention.
State symbols: No specific mention.
Independence/secession: No specific mention.
Accession/unification: No specific mention.
Border delimitation: No specific mention.
Cross-border provision: No specific mention.

Governance

Political institutions (new or reformed): No specific mention.
Elections: No specific mention.
Electoral commission: No specific mention.
Political parties reform: No specific mention.
Civil society: Page 1, 2. b. 2)... improved mechanism as follows:
a) All security authorities should conduct effective socialization in advance down to all lower levels.
b) Add and empower the Monitoring Team on Security Matters (MTSM) and HDC staff.
Traditional/religious leaders: No specific mention.
Public administration: No specific mention.
Constitution: No specific mention.

Power sharing

Political power sharing: No specific mention.
Territorial power sharing: No specific mention.
Economic power sharing: No specific mention.
Military power sharing: No specific mention.

Human rights and equality

Human rights/RoL general: No specific mention.
Bill of rights/similar: No specific mention.
Treaty incorporation: No specific mention.
Civil and political rights: No specific mention.
Socio-economic rights: No specific mention.

Rights related issues

Citizenship: No specific mention.
Democracy: No specific mention.
Detention procedures: No specific mention.
Media and communication: No specific mention.
Mobility/access: No specific mention.
Protection measures: No specific mention.
Other: No specific mention.

Rights institutions

NHRI: No specific mention.
Regional or international human rights institutions: No specific mention.

Justice sector reform

Criminal justice and emergency law: No specific mention.
State of emergency provisions: No specific mention.
Judiciary and courts: No specific mention.
Prisons and detention: No specific mention.
Traditional Laws: No specific mention.

Socio-economic reconstruction

Development or socio-economic reconstruction: No specific mention.
National economic plan: No specific mention.
Natural resources: No specific mention.
International funds: No specific mention.
Business: No specific mention.
Taxation: No specific mention.
Banks: No specific mention.

Land, property and environment

Land reform/rights: No specific mention.
Pastoralist/nomadism rights: No specific mention.
Cultural heritage: No specific mention.
Environment: No specific mention.
Water or riparian rights or access: No specific mention.

Security sector

Security Guarantees: No specific mention.
Ceasefire: Security sector→Ceasefire→Ceasefire provision
[Summary] Both sides evaluated the Cessation of Hostilities signed February 2001, and the implementation of the 13-day Peace Zone.

Page 1, 2. a. Opinion of the RI JCSM representatives:
1) Based on the evaluation of the RI JCSM representatives and the Field Commanders of TNl/Polri, the thirteen-day Peace Zone in North Aceh and Bireuen was not a success, because violence by GAM continued, for example; there were twelve ambushes against TNl/Polri, three attacks against RI Headquarters, three shooting incidents, one killing, three explosions, one arson attack, one incident of extortion, as well as other acts of violence in contravention of the agreement on the Cessation of Violence.

Page 2, 2. b. 2)... improved mechanism as follows:
a) All security authorities should conduct effective socialization in advance down to all lower levels.
b) Add and empower the Monitoring Team on Security Matters (MTSM) and HDC staff.
c) All agreements to be socialized to the public.

Page 2, c. Since both sides' opinions are very different, the Peace Zone pilot project in North Aceh and Bireuen is not to be continued .
Police: Page 2,
4. Both sides appeal to the TNl/Polri and GAM to restrain themselves and follow the 16 points of the Cessation of Violence Agreement in Aceh.
Armed forces: Page 1, 2. a. Opinion of the RI JCSM representatives:
1) Based on the evaluation of the RI JCSM representatives and the Field Commanders of TNl/Polri, the thirteen-day Peace Zone in North Aceh and Bireuen was not a success, because violence by GAM continued, for example; there were twelve ambushes against TNl/Polri, three attacks against RI Headquarters, three shooting incidents, one killing, three explosions, one arson attack, one incident of extortion, as well as other acts of violence in contravention of the agreement on the Cessation of Violence.

Page 2,
4. Both sides appeal to the TNl/Polri and GAM to restrain themselves and follow the 16 points of the Cessation of Violence Agreement in Aceh.
DDR: No specific mention.
Intelligence services: No specific mention.
Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces: Page 1, 2. a. Opinion of the RI JCSM representatives:
1) Based on the evaluation of the RI JCSM representatives and the Field Commanders of TNl/Polri, the thirteen-day Peace Zone in North Aceh and Bireuen was not a success, because violence by GAM continued, for example; there were twelve ambushes against TNl/Polri, three attacks against RI Headquarters, three shooting incidents, one killing, three explosions, one arson attack, one incident of extortion, as well as other acts of violence in contravention of the agreement on the Cessation of Violence.
2) Considering the facts above, it is not reasonable to maintain or to prolong the Peace Zone because GAM did not obey the agreement.

Page 2, 2. b
1) Even though the violence throughout the Peace Zone could not be decreased as expected, and after considering public opinion, GAM recommends that the Peace Zone should be prolonged with improved mechanism as follows:

Page 2,
4. Both sides appeal to the TNl/Polri and GAM to restrain themselves and follow the 16 points of the Cessation of Violence Agreement in Aceh.
Withdrawal of foreign forces: No specific mention.
Corruption: No specific mention.
Crime/organised crime: No specific mention.
Drugs: No specific mention.
Terrorism: No specific mention.

Transitional justice

Transitional justice general: No specific mention.
Amnesty/pardon: No specific mention.
Courts: No specific mention.
Mechanism: No specific mention.
Prisoner release: No specific mention.
Vetting: No specific mention.
Victims: No specific mention.
Missing persons: No specific mention.
Reparations: No specific mention.
Reconciliation: No specific mention.

Implementation

UN signatory: No specific mention.
Other international signatory: No specific mention.
Referendum for agreement: No specific mention.
International mission/force/similar: No specific mention.
Enforcement mechanism: No specific mention.
Related cases: No specific mention.
Source: On file with author.

Evaluation of the Conduct of Cessation of Violence

As an evaluative response to the security situation in Aceh, RI and GAM Joint Committee on Security Matters have constituted a three- day meeting from 2nd- 4th April 2001 which was aimed at evaluating the conduct of the Cessation of Violence, which has been applied to the ground since 1Oth April 2001.

The meeting was convened at the Kuala Tripa Hotel, Banda Aceh.

The results of the meeting are as follows:

1. Both sides maintain their agreement on the Cessation of Violence throughout Aceh as signed at the Commander-to- Commander meeting of 1Oth February 2001 .

The agreement is to continue to be used as the basis and guideline for ali operations in the field.

2. Both sides have evaluated the implementation of the 13-day Peace Zone in the Districts of North Aceh and Bireuen.

The results are as follows:

a. Opinion of the RI JCSM representatives:

1) Based on the evaluation of the RI JCSM representatives and the Field Commanders of TNl/Polri, the thirteen-day Peace Zone in North Aceh and Bireuen was not a success, because violence by GAM continued, for example;

there were twelve ambushes against TNl/Polri, three attacks against RI Headquarters, three shooting incidents, one killing, three explosions, one arson attack, one incident of extortion, as well as other acts of violence in contravention of the agreement on the Cessation of Violence.

2) Considering the facts above, it is not reasonable to maintain or to prolong the Peace Zone because GAM did not obey the agreement.

b. Opinion of the GAM JCSM representatives:

1) The evaluation of the 13-day Peace Zone pilot project in North Aceh and Bireuen revealed some progress.

2) Even though the violence throughout the Peace Zone could not be decreased as expected, and after considering public opinion, GAM recommends that the Peace Zone should be prolonged with improved mechanism as follows:

a) All security authorities should conduct effective socialization in advance down to all lower levels.

b) Add and empower the Monitoring Team on Security Matters (MTSM) and HDC staff.

c) All agreements to be socialized to the public.

c. Since both sides' opinions are very different, the Peace Zone pilot project in North Aceh and Bireuen is not to be continued .

3. Both sides agree to reconstitute a meeting on or before l Oth April 2001.

4. Both sides appeal to the TNl/Polri and GAM to restrain themselves and follow the 16 points of the Cessation of Violence Agreement in Aceh.

lssued in Banda Aceh Dated on 4th April 2001

Representing Rl-JCSM Representing GAM-JCSM

KB. Pol.

Drs.

Ridhwan Karim Tgk.

Nashiruddin bin Ahmed

Witnessed by Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)