Peace Agreement Access Tool PA-X https://test.pax.peaceagreements.org/

Country/entity Indonesia

Aceh

Region Asia and Pacific

Agreement name Evaluation of the Conduct of Cessation of Violence

Date 4 Apr 2001

Agreement status Multiparty signed/agreed

Interim Yes

arrangement

Agreement/conflict Intrastate/intrastate conflict

level

Indonesian Conflicts (1976 -)

Aceh Conflict (1976 -)

After a decade of increasing grievances against the centralist tendencies of the Suharto-government, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) started a military campaign in 1976 for the independence of the province in the far northeast of the Indonesian archipelago. After near defeat in 1979, GAM regained strength with Libyan support and the heaviest fighting occurred during the late 1980s when the Indonesian military intensified its violent counter-insurgency policies. The devastating tsunami in December 2004 effectively destroyed Aceh's infrastructure and severely reduced the operational capabilities of GAM. This weakening led to a signed peace agreement in August 2005, facilitated by the Finish NGO CMI Peace Negotiations.

Indonesia-Moluccas Conflict (1999-2002)

The fall of Suharto in 1997 sparked off a number of conflicts across Indonesia. In the Moluccas region, the administrative division was divided into Moluccas and North Moluccas, thereby exacerbating a conflict characterised by communal and sectarian divisions. In part these divisions were a result of an official government transmigration programme running from late 1960s onwards that spurred conflict over resources, including land. Faith-based militias were generally responsible for the fighting from 1999 until 2002, including Laskar Jihad, and human rights abuses were committed by both sides. Opportunistic crime was also responsible for of the violence. The military campaign by Lashkar Islam was aimed to displacing Christian residents. One such event was the expulsion of the Christian residents of the Banda Islands in April 1999. The conflict ended with the signing of the Malino II Accord on 13 February 2002.

Close

Indonesian Conflicts (1976 -

)

Stage Ceasefire/related

Conflict nature Government/territory

Peace process Indonesia-Aceh peace process

Parties Republic of Indonesia JSCM, KB. Pol. Drs. Ridhwan Karim,

GAM-JSCM, Tgk. Nashiruddin bin Ahmed

Third parties Witnessed by Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

Description -

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Groups

Children/youth No specific mention.

Disabled persons No specific mention.

Elderly/age No specific mention.

Migrant workers No specific mention.

Racial/ethnic/ national group No specific mention.

Religious groups No specific mention.

Indigenous people No specific mention.

Other groups No specific mention.

Refugees/displaced No specific mention.

persons

Social class No specific mention.

Gender

Women, girls and

gender

No specific mention.

Men and boys No specific mention.

LGBTI No specific mention.

Family No specific mention.

State definition

Nature of state

(general)

No specific mention.

State configuration No specific mention.

Self determination No specific mention.

Referendum No specific mention.

State symbols No specific mention.

Independence/

secession

No specific mention.

Accession/

unification

No specific mention.

Border delimitation No specific mention.

Cross-border

provision

No specific mention.

Governance

Political

No specific mention.

institutions (new or

reformed)

Elections No specific mention.

Electoral commission No specific mention.

Political parties

reform

No specific mention.

Civil society

Page 1, 2. b. 2)... improved mechanism as follows:

a) All security authorities should conduct effective socialization in advance down to all

lower levels.

b) Add and empower the Monitoring Team on Security Matters (MTSM) and HDC staff.

Traditional/

religious leaders

No specific mention.

Public

administration

No specific mention.

Constitution

No specific mention.

Power sharing

Political power

sharing

No specific mention.

Territorial power

sharing

No specific mention.

Economic power

sharing

No specific mention.

Military power

sharing

No specific mention.

Human rights and equality

Human rights/RoL No specific mention.

general

Bill of rights/similar No specific mention.

Treaty

No specific mention.

incorporation

Civil and political

No specific mention.

rights

Socio-economic

No specific mention.

rights

Rights related issues

Citizenship No specific mention.

Democracy No specific mention.

Detention procedures

No specific mention.

Media and communication

No specific mention.

Mobility/access No specific mention.

Protection

No specific mention.

measures

Other

No specific mention.

Rights institutions

NHRI No specific mention.

Regional or international human rights institutions

No specific mention.

Justice sector reform

Criminal justice and No specific mention. **emergency law**

State of emergency No specific mention.

provisions

Judiciary and

No specific mention.

courts

Prisons and

No specific mention.

detention

Traditional Laws No specific mention.

Socio-economic reconstruction

Development or

No specific mention.

socio-economic reconstruction

National economic No specific mention.

plan

Natural resources No specific mention.

International funds No specific mention.

Business No specific mention.

Taxation No specific mention.

Banks No specific mention.

Land, property and environment

Land reform/rights No specific mention.

Pastoralist/

No specific mention.

nomadism rights

Cultural heritage No specific mention.

Environment

No specific mention.

Water or riparian

No specific mention.

rights or access

Security sector

Security Guarantees

No specific mention.

Ceasefire

Security sector→Ceasefire→Ceasefire provision

[Summary] Both sides evaluated the Cessation of Hostilities signed February 2001, and the implementation of the 13-day Peace Zone.

Page 1, 2. a. Opinion of the RI JCSM representatives:

1) Based on the evaluation of the RI JCSM representatives and the Field Commanders of TNI/Polri, the thirteen-day Peace Zone in North Aceh and Bireuen was not a success, because violence by GAM continued, for example; there were twelve ambushes against TNI/Polri, three attacks against RI Headquarters, three shooting incidents, one killing, three explosions, one arson attack, one incident of extortion, as well as other acts of violence in contravention of the agreement on the Cessation of Violence.

Page 2, 2. b. 2)... improved mechanism as follows:

- a) All security authorities should conduct effective socialization in advance down to all lower levels.
- b) Add and empower the Monitoring Team on Security Matters (MTSM) and HDC staff.
- c) All agreements to be socialized to the public.

Page 2, c. Since both sides' opinions are very different, the Peace Zone pilot project in North Aceh and Bireuen is not to be continued .

Police

Page 2,

4. Both sides appeal to the TNI/Polri and GAM to restrain themselves and follow the 16 points of the Cessation of Violence Agreement in Aceh.

Armed forces

Page 1, 2. a. Opinion of the RI JCSM representatives:

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Page 2,

4. Both sides appeal to the TNI/Polri and GAM to restrain themselves and follow the 16 points of the Cessation of Violence Agreement in Aceh.

DDR

No specific mention.

Intelligence services

No specific mention.

Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces

Page 1, 2. a. Opinion of the RI JCSM representatives:

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2) Considering the facts above, it is not reasonable to maintain or to prolong the Peace Zone because GAM did not obey the agreement.

Page 2, 2. b

1) Even though the violence throughout the Peace Zone could not be decreased as expected, and after considering public opinion, GAM recommends that the Peace Zone should be prolonged with improved mechanism as follows:

Page 2,

4. Both sides appeal to the TNI/Polri and GAM to restrain themselves and follow the 16 points of the Cessation of Violence Agreement in Aceh.

Withdrawal of foreign forces

No specific mention.

Corruption No specific mention.

Crime/organised crime

No specific mention.

Drugs No specific mention.

Terrorism No specific mention.

Transitional justice

Transitional justice No specific mention.

general

Amnesty/pardon No specific mention.

Courts No specific mention.

Mechanism No specific mention.

Prisoner release No specific mention.

Vetting No specific mention.

Victims No specific mention.

Missing persons No specific mention.

Reparations No specific mention.

Reconciliation No specific mention.

Implementation

UN signatory No specific mention.

Other international No specific mention.

signatory

Referendum for agreement

No specific mention.

International

No specific mention.

mission/force/ similar

Enforcement mechanism

No specific mention.

Related cases

No specific mention.

Source

On file with author.