

Country/entity	Syria
Region	Middle East and North Africa
Agreement name	Agreement between Tahrir al-Sham and Nour al-Din al-Zenki in Tal Adeh
Date	30 Dec 2018
Agreement status	Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement	Yes
Agreement/conflict level	Intrastate/local conflict

Syrian Conflicts (1948 -) (1976 - 2005) (2011 -)

The agreements relate to three different conflict contexts. Israel-Syria and Syria-Lebanon. The Syrian-Israeli conflict was a key factor for the Syrian intervention during the Lebanese Civil War, with Syrian-backed Palestinian Liberation Army units intervened in 1976 against the Palestinian/Leftist militias. Following a massacre at Tel al-Zaatar that year, Syria was forced to accept a ceasefire at a meeting of the Arab League. However, the Arab League also mandated an Arab Deterrence Force, consisting of mostly Syrian soldiers with token contributions from other Arab League states, thus further legitimizing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. During a second bout of fighting that began in 1989, caused by the formation of rival Lebanese regimes in East and West Beirut, the Syrian-backed regime won and in 1991 the 'Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination' was signed to legalize the Syrian occupation as a means to ensure the security of Syria. Syrian forces were forced to withdraw in 2005 following possible involvement in the assassination of Lebanon's President Hariri.

Syria-internal. In 2011, domestic upheaval following a wave of protests across the Arab World soon led to violent repression of protestors by Syrian government troops. The violence progressed steadily and by July 2011 the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed consisting of defected military units and new recruits. The FSA and rebel umbrella group known as the Syrian National Council represented the first attempt at coordinating rebel factions in late 2011. However, a steady influx of foreign fighters and increased sectarianism radicalised opposition groups, which relied on foreign funding. The nature of the conflict changed drastically in late 2013 as infighting among the opposition groups increased. One of the more significant developments was the split between the al-Qaeda outfits the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, ISIS), and Jabhat al-Nusra in early 2014 in addition to the intensified targeting of other rebel factions by ISIS fighters in particular, including the Kurdish Peshmerga, the FSA and other jihadist outfits. Since the summer of 2014, the conflict was further internationalized when ISIS announced the formation of an Islamic state eroding the state line between Iraq and Syria and also in mid-2015 when Russian forces intervened on behalf of the Bashar al-Assad government in Damascus.

Close

Syrian Conflicts (1948 -) (1976 - 2005) (2011 -)

Stage	Other
Conflict nature	Inter-group
Peace process	Syrian Local Agreements
Parties	National Liberation Front (Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement), Abdo Zamzam National Liberation Front, Jaber Ali al-Basha Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Abu Ubaida Kafrhor
Third parties	Ansar al-Din
Description	Three point agreement providing for resolution of a set of 'tit-for-tat' killings, by providing for a process of adjudication relating to the latest killing, and provision to restore inter-group relationships and (implicitly) the ceasefire.

Agreement document [SY_181230_AgreementbetweenTahriral-ShamandNoural-Dinal-ZenkiTalAdeh_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

Agreement document (original language) [SY_181230_AgreementbetweenTahriral-ShamandNoural-Dinal-ZenkiTalAdeh_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

Local agreement properties

Process type Informal but persistent process

Rationale -> Local issues only; no external support mechanism; culture of signing There is no formally established mechanism to support the negotiation between Salafi armed groups. Moreover, this agreement is linked to local issues only. Yet, it seems that both signing parties choose to solve daily pragmatic issues related to their armed struggle through agreements. Although one cannot speak of a “culture” of signing peace agreements, the parties are involved (in a non-proactive and non-conscious way) in a persistent practice of signing local agreements. The agreement must be seen in the light of multiple local level processes in Aleppo governorate in late 2017.

Is there a documented link to a national peace process? No

Link to national process: articulated rationale No link to the national peace process in Syria is mentioned in the agreement, neither it can be inferred from further research. First, the agreement does not involve local governance actors; and the signing parties themselves are not official state representative. Second, all parties to the agreement reject the national peace process, as it would maintain Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government in power. The agreement stipulates that a joint chamber of operation should be formed to topple the Bashar al-Assad's regime. Finally, the agreement should be understood in the context of an "intra-religious insurgent groups" conflict where several factions that all oppose Bashar al-Assad engaged in fighting and took some distance from their initial raison d'être in the context of the Syrian civil war.

Name of Locale Talada

Nature of Locale Smaller

GPS Lat/Long (DD) 36.253028, 36.801925

Participant type Local armed group

Mediator, facilitator or similar No mention of mediator or similar

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture) Page 1, In the Name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds, and prayers and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad and upon, his family and companions, and after:

Grievance List Page 1, After the meeting between brothers from the National Liberation Front (al-Zenki Movement) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham about the sinful killing that took place in the village of Tal Adeh, the Zenki Movement reported its narration about the incident, stating that a civilian group from Beyet Al-Barsha lives in the Euphrates Shield areas infiltrated the Al-Qatura Junction through a road called Al-Warsh, towards the village of Tal Adeh, they carried out the killing, and confessed about it in revenge for their previous killers, while Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stated that the group infiltrated from al-Zenki positions in Jabal Barakat to the village of Tal Adeh and killed the brothers and that it had its evidence for that, and accordingly, the following was agreed upon:

Cattle rustling/ banditry No specific mention.

Social cover Page 1, 2. Handing over the accused persons to Ansar al-Din as a third party within a maximum period of twenty-four hours from its date
