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| <b>Country/entity</b>      | Yemen  |
| <b>Region</b>              | Middle East and North Africa   |
| <b>Agreement name</b>      | Document of Reconciliation and Forgiveness Between the Families of the Al Ali bin Ahmad Al Awlaqi Clan |
| <b>Date</b>                | 7 Apr 2019   |
| <b>Agreement status</b>    | Multiparty signed/agreed   |
| <b>Interim arrangement</b> | Yes  |

### **Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )**

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

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|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Stage</b>           | Framework/substantive - comprehensive |
| <b>Conflict nature</b> | Inter-group                           |
| <b>Peace process</b>   | Yemen Inter-group Agreements          |

**Parties**

Sheikh Saleh bin Fareed bin Muhsin Al Awlaqi  
[SIGNED]

Muhammad Mufni Abdullah Fareed  
[SIGNED]

Sheikh Saleh bin Abdullah BaDhayaf  
[SIGNED]

Abdullah Masa' Abd Rabboh Batinah  
[SIGNED]

Sheikh Abdullah Saeed Al Qirai'  
[SIGNED]

Ali Ahmad Muhammad  
[SIGNED]

Muhammad Ali Al Sawd  
[SIGNED]

Saber Nasser  
[SIGNED]

Ahmad Fareed Hadi Abdullah  
[SIGNED]

[ILLEGIBLE]  
[SIGNED]

Awadh Muhammad Al Tabalah  
[SIGNED]

Abdullah Saleh Abdullah Al Fayadh  
[SIGNED]

Nasser Salem Ahmad BaFayadh  
[SIGNED]

Ali Salem Barlak  
[SIGNED]

Mahdi Nasser Ali Muneeb Saber BaHada  
[SIGNED]

Saleh Salem Al Saadi BaFat  
[SIGNED]

Saleh Ahmad Omar Al Madhaji  
[SIGNED]

Abdullah Saleh Salem Mithaq  
[SIGNED]

Khalid Abdullah Shidhayah

**Third parties** CC:  
- The Office of the Minister of Interior  
- The Governor of the Shabwa Governorate  
- The Governorate Security Director  
- The Al Saeed Court Judge  
- The Al Saeed Public Prosecutor  
- The Shabwa Appellate Court Judge  
- The Shabwa Appellate Public Prosecutor

**Description** This agreement which addresses an ongoing tribal conflict, commits the parties to reconciling sub-divisions within the same clan, drawing a line under the dispute and recognising the signing as an official pardon of all those involved in the conflict by the wider clan. Societal leaders and dignitaries of the clan addressed issues involved in the tribal conflict including specific incidents of killings during a period between 2014 and 2019. These issues are expressed as unresolved by the previous related agreement, this agreement commits the signatories to ensure that compensations are made to the families of 11 men killed in the tribal feud as well as ensuring general reconciliation across all branches of the tribe.

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**Agreement document** [YE\\_190407\\_Document of Reconciliation btw Tribes of Al Ali bin Ahmed al-Awlaqi\\_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

**Agreement document (original language)** [YE\\_190407\\_Document of Reconciliation btw Tribes of Al Ali bin Ahmed al-Awlaqi\\_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

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### Local agreement properties

**Process type** Formal structured process

**Rationale** It appears there is a systematic process of invitation of important social figures within the local network made by a Sheikh in this agreement (and this also tends to reoccur as a normative practice in a number of other tribal agreements throughout the country). There also appears to be a historic practice of signing similar types of agreement carried out by the tribe involved, this is explicitly mentioned in the agreement text. There is some form of support in the form of presence/encouragement/witnessing(to be clarified by 'CC' but possibly suggests form of presence) by either or both regional leaders and national figureheads, in the form of the interior ministry - even if CC does just mean copied or informed of the agreement, there may be meaning as to why this local agreement specifically was raised for attention at that level.

**Is there a documented link to a national peace process?** No

**Link to national process: articulated rationale** There is no direct reference of the wider process in the text - either by content/specific issues or to the broader process. There is an ambiguous mention of the 'representatives'(which could involve those listed as 'CC' as the text notes representatives as being prominent/social figures)expressing the importance of the need for 'unity' in light of the 'difficult situation we are going through' - which may be a reference to the wider conflict in the context of the sentence. There may also be meaning or interpretation in the fact that one of the third parties is the office of the minister of interior - a government body which has been at the forefront of attempting to manage the armed forces connected to the Southern Transitional Council, as it has evolved as its own entity in the South. Traditionally the governorate(Shabwah) that this agreement addresses would be central to this devolved Southern power dynamic, as Shabwah has historically tended to hold a level of autonomy from central government. This connection to broader national efforts regarding Hadi's process and national unity could explain the presence/mention of the interior ministry in this agreement.

**Name of Locale** Shabwah

**Nature of Locale** Region

**GPS Lat/Long (DD)** 14.529495, 46.829847

**Participant type** Local armed group

**Mediator, facilitator or similar** Mediator or similar referred to

**Mediator (references)** Sheikh Saleh bin Fareed bin Muhsin Al Awlaqi is considered as the Mediator here as the person who invites the parties to talks and signs the agreement himself.

**Type of mediator/facilitator/similar** Domestic religious organisation/leader or other elder

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**Local issues**

**Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)**

Page 1, In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Page 1, All praises be to Allah, who said “Whoever pardons and seeks reconciliation, then their reward is with Allah.”

Page 1, And He said: “Whoever saves a life, it will be as if they saved all of humanity.”

Page 1, Untitled preamble, ... This bloodshed has been carried out without purpose and without end, harming everyone, and it does not please Allah, his Messenger, or any human being for this to continue. These representatives saw the importance of finding root solution to all of these problems, ensuring that these solutions please Allah and please all involved, especially since we are in dire need today of unity and to stand together because of the difficult situation that we are going through requires that we all stand together. We also hope to build a solid foundation of brotherhood and cooperation, as well as a safe future for us and our children, free of any of the negatives and diseases of the past. ...

Page 2, May Allah guide us.



**Grievance List**

Page 1, Paragraph 1, ...This document is applicable for all of the issues that were not included within the scope of tribal vendettas as they are known to the tribes of Arabia, and it includes the issues that have come up recently, starting with the accidental killings and followed by cases of killings. These issues were solved with solutions that were incorrect and irrational, and there were specific entities that were benefitting from these problems and feeding into them.

Based on that, the families of Al Ali bin Ahmad clan, represented by their sheikhs, dignitaries, elders, prominent figures, and social figures, have met on this blessed day and agreed to put an end to this bloodshed between the members of the clan. This bloodshed has been carried out without purpose and without end, harming everyone, and it does not please Allah, his Messenger, or any human being for this to continue.

Page 2, Paragraph 1, The cases that are addressed by this document were selected, and they are the cases of eleven men who were killed. They were all from the tribes of Ali bin Ahmad, and the following is a list of their names:

1. Ahmad Hanash Awadh
2. Aamer Muhammad Ali Atef
3. Muhammad Abdullah Awadh Al Sawah
4. Jamel Khalid Muhammad Ali Atef
5. Muhammad Salem Ali Numair
6. Saleh Nasser Salem Atiah
7. Ali Muhammad Hussein Al Arsah
8. Abu Bakr Ahmad Hanash Awadh
9. Saleh Salem Al Ja'ar
10. Assem Nasser Atef
11. Abdullah Salem Nasser Al Awfah

Naturally the listing of the names of the men should be viewed implicitly as a form of grievance and the provisions then go on to expand on the actions to be taken in relation to the provision that lists the names.

Page 2, 1. All of the eleven men who were killed are the men of the Ali bin Ahmad clan, and they are all our brothers and our sons. Their loss is our loss, and it is our blood that was shed.

**Cattle rustling/  
banditry**

No specific mention.

**Social cover**

No specific mention.