

<b>Country/entity</b>	Syria
<b>Region</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>Agreement name</b>	Agreement between Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Ahrar al-Sham, Aleppo
<b>Date</b>	7 Jan 2014
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes
<b>Agreement/conflict level</b>	Intrastate/local conflict

### Syrian Conflicts (1948 - ) (1976 - 2005) (2011 - )

The agreements relate to three different conflict contexts. Israel-Syria and Syria-Lebanon. The Syrian-Israeli conflict was a key factor for the Syrian intervention during the Lebanese Civil War, with Syrian-backed Palestinian Liberation Army units intervened in 1976 against the Palestinian/Leftist militias. Following a massacre at Tel al-Zaatar that year, Syria was forced to accept a ceasefire at a meeting of the Arab League. However, the Arab League also mandated an Arab Deterrence Force, consisting of mostly Syrian soldiers with token contributions from other Arab League states, thus further legitimizing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. During a second bout of fighting that began in 1989, caused by the formation of rival Lebanese regimes in East and West Beirut, the Syrian-backed regime won and in 1991 the 'Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination' was signed to legalize the Syrian occupation as a means to ensure the security of Syria. Syrian forces were forced to withdraw in 2005 following possible involvement in the assassination of Lebanon's President Hariri.

Syria-internal. In 2011, domestic upheaval following a wave of protests across the Arab World soon led to violent repression of protestors by Syrian government troops. The violence progressed steadily and by July 2011 the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed consisting of defected military units and new recruits. The FSA and rebel umbrella group known as the Syrian National Council represented the first attempt at coordinating rebel factions in late 2011. However, a steady influx of foreign fighters and increased sectarianism radicalised opposition groups, which relied on foreign funding. The nature of the conflict changed drastically in late 2013 as infighting among the opposition groups increased. One of the more significant developments was the split between the al-Qaeda outfits the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, ISIS), and Jabhat al-Nusra in early 2014 in addition to the intensified targeting of other rebel factions by ISIS fighters in particular, including the Kurdish Peshmerga, the FSA and other jihadist outfits. Since the summer of 2014, the conflict was further internationalized when ISIS announced the formation of an Islamic state eroding the state line between Iraq and Syria and also in mid-2015 when Russian forces intervened on behalf of the Bashar al-Assad government in Damascus.

Close

Syrian Conflicts (1948 - ) (1976 - 2005) (2011 - )

<b>Stage</b>	Ceasefire/related
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Other
<b>Peace process</b>	Syrian Local Agreements
<b>Parties</b>	Omar al-Shishani, the representative of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant; Abu Khalid al-Suri the representative of the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement.
<b>Third parties</b>	-
<b>Description</b>	Agreement aims to defuse tensions between ISIS and HTS regarding which areas to take. In effect the agreement splits territory between the two groups, including roads and checkpoints, whereby both sides agree to not fight each other.

**Agreement document** [SY\\_140207\\_Aleppo Agreement\\_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

**Agreement document (original language)** [SY\\_140207\\_Aleppo Agreement\\_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

### Local agreement properties

**Process type** Informal but persistent process

**Rationale** -> Local issues only; no external support mechanism; culture of signing No formally-established mechanism supported the negotiation between the Salafi-Jihadi armed groups. Moreover, this agreement cannot be linked to the national peace process. Indeed, both groups have a Salafist ideology; they oppose the rule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and reject the idea of a national negotiation to solve the conflict. Yet, it seems that both signing parties choose to solve daily pragmatic issues related to their armed struggle through agreements. Indeed, before the declaration of the Islamic State in late-June 2014, ISIS had a less radical stance on other jihadi groups and was inclined to negotiate or even ally with them. Although one cannot speak of a “culture” of signing peace agreements, the parties are involved (in a non-proactive and non-conscious way) in a persistent practice of signing local agreements.

**Is there a documented link to a national peace process?** No

**Link to national process: articulated rationale** No link to the national peace process in Syria is mentioned in the agreement, neither it can be inferred from further research. First, the agreement does not involve local governance actors; and the signing parties themselves are not official state representative. Second, all parties to the agreement reject the national peace process, as it would maintain Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government in power.

**Name of Locale** al-Sukkar, al-Abqar

**Nature of Locale** Smaller

**GPS Lat/Long (DD)** 36.098961, 37.943556

**Participant type** Local armed group  
International or transnational actor

**Mediator, facilitator or similar** No mention of mediator or similar

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**Local issues**

**Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)** Page 1, In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful  
Page 1, All praise be to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon our master, Muhammad, His Messenger.

**Grievance List** Although the agreement does not refer to specific causes of the conflict, it seems that the confrontation between the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Ahrar al-Sham for the control of an airport lies at the centre of the dispute. It lists five provisions to address local grievances.

- Page 1,
1. It was agreed that not a single shot would be fired in the direction of the Islamic State, and this agreement includes the road to the end of the airport on the main road only.
  2. Omar al-Shishani, the representative of the Islamic State, pledges to not conduct strikes against the airport at all.
  3. Omar al-Shishani pledges to take the Abqar Road and not the public airport road.
  4. The barrier in front of the Abqar Fork shall be lifted on both sides, and Ahrar al-Sham will move their barrier to directly in front of the Airport Road Fork.
  5. The detainees on both sides shall be released [ILLEGIBLE] al-Sukkar and al-Abqar, and all of the barriers in these areas.

**Cattle rustling/ banditry** No specific mention.

**Social cover** No specific mention.

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