Agreement between Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) and the Islamic State (IS)

Country/entity
Syria
Region
Middle East and North Africa
Agreement name
Agreement between Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) and the Islamic State (IS)
Date
27 Nov 2017
Agreement status
Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement
Yes
Agreement/conflict level
Intrastate/local conflict
Stage
Ceasefire/related
Conflict nature
Inter-group
Peace process
Syrian Local Agreements
Parties
Islamic State (IS, ISIS);
Syrian Defence Forces (SDF)
Third parties
-
Description
Three part agreement with sections providing for military, political and economic issues.


Local agreement properties

Process type
Isolated example
Rationale
-> Local issues only; no external support mechanism; no culture of signing The tensions between IS and other parts to the Syrian conflict are rarely solved with agreements, as the group does not recognise the legitimacy of any other actor, especially non-religious ones as it is the case of the Syrian Defence Forces. The truce (hudna) was probably seen as a necessity for IS’ soldiers who have been losing ground in Iraq and Syria since 2015. Moreover, only one previous local agreement (ceasefire) was reportedly signed in this locale between the YPG and the Syrian Army on 23 August 2016. Finally, no established mechanisms supported the negotiation. Hence, the agreement cannot be placed within the context of a systematic process of local agreements.
Is there a documented link to a national peace process?
No
Link to national process: articulated rationale
No link to the national peace process in Syria is mentioned in the agreement, neither it can be inferred from further research. First, the agreement does not involve local governance actors; and the signing parties themselves are not official state representative. It is not clear how the Syrian Defence Forces are affiliated to the Syrian army. As a humanitarian and civil organisation, they have been part of the International Civil Fence Organisation since 1972 onward. Moreover, they have been assisting the Syrian Arab Army – the land force branch of the Syrian Armed Forces – in several governorates such as Damascus, Deir Ezzor Raqqa and in Eastern Ghouta. Yet, the agreement has not been formally endorsed or recognised by any state representative. Hence, it cannot be safely asserted that the Syrian Defence Forces represent the state authority. Second, IS fully rejects the national peace process, as it would maintain Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government in power.
Name of Locale
al-Hasakah
Nature of Locale
Region
GPS Lat/Long (DD)
36.511684, 40.742253
Participant type
International or transnational actor
Mediator, facilitator or similar
No mention of mediator or similar

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)
Page 1, In the name of God, most Gracious, most Compassionate

Page 2, Only Allah leads to prosperity and guides to the straight path.
Grievance List
Although the agreement does not refer to specific causes of the conflict, it seems that the confrontation between the Islamic State and the Syrian Defence Forces in the province of Barka lies at the centre of the dispute. The issue of captured soldiers and control over oil wells seem particularly important to the parties.
Cattle rustling/banditry

No specific mention.

Social cover

No specific mention.


In the name of God, most Gracious, most Compassionate

A. Military:

1. An immediate cessation of all fighting between the two parties until the end date of negotiations.

2. The duration of the truce is a month with possibility for extension, beginning on 20/11/2017 and ending 28/12/2017.

3. The two parties will determine safe geographical boundaries [a demarcation line].

4. The soldiers of the Islamic state [must not] be subjected to attack whilst carrying out military actions against parties outside of this agreement.

5. All military actions against the Islamic State [by the Syrian Defence Force] will cease including airstrikes and artillery.

6. The Islamic State is committed to ending military action against the other party in the agreement.

7. The Islamic State is committed to ending security actions [...]1 during the agreement [period] in the direct conflict area in Barka province [Hassakeh].

8. Both parties will establish a military coordination room and install a hotline between them.

9. Establishing communications will solve accidental or erroneous firing and the responsible party will provide a reason as well as immediately resolve the matter.

10. Military coordinators from both sides will report any movement on the front lines and their destination, as well as their purpose and proximity to either party, to ensure stability.

B. Political:

1. Islamic State soldiers captured before this agreement by the Syrian Defence Force will not be handed over to any party beyond this agreement and negotiations will remain between agreement parties.

2. Working on the issue of prisoners with the competent authorities of both parties.

3. Define the regions and parties involved in the agreement.​

4. Non-exposure of the arrivals to the territory of the Islamic state from Jaysh al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar.

5. Any breach [of the agreement] by any party will be registered and referred to the competent

6. Existing problems will be solved directly between the parties.

D. Economic:

1. Trade crossings to the Islamic State magistrate will open and neither side will block movement of goods.

2. Remaining oil wells under the authority of the Islamic State will remain under their authority.

3. Syrian Defence Forces will provide safety to Islamic State fighters leaving their territories for the purpose of medical treatment.

The truce will end on the agreed date or when a party annuls the terms of the truce.

The Islamic State does not breach covenants and works to fulfil the obligations and is not responsible for any individual behaviour of its members or loyalists other than its soldiers.

Only Allah leads to prosperity and guides to the straight path.