Country/entity

Yemen

Region

Middle East and North Africa

Agreement name

Dhalea Ceasefire

Date

20 Apr 2016

Agreement status

Multiparty signed/agreed

Interim arrangement

Yes

Agreement/conflict level

Intrastate/local conflict

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh’s General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah (‘reform’) party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People’s Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen’s traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen’s peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa’dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi’a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern ‘al-Hiraak’ movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana’a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year deadlock ensued until negotiations between the Houthis and the government of Yemen finally culminated in the Stockholm Agreement in December 2018. However, throughout 2019 the Saudi-led coalition continues to launch airstrikes. Furthermore, in May 2017 the Southern al-Hiraak movement had declared the secessionist formation of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), seizing the interim-capital Aden by January 2018. Territorial divisions between the Yemeni government, the Houthis, forces affiliated with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, local militias and tribes have continued to fracture the country.

Close

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )

Stage

Ceasefire/related

Conflict nature

Government/territory

Peace process

Yemen peace process

Parties

Representatives of Government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi:
Ahmad ‘Abadi al-Mu’akar 
Mohammad Ghalib al- Dhahiri 
Lieutenant Colonel ‘Ail ‘Abdu al- Ghriani 
Tahir ‘Abad al-Assad 
Feysal Satah Shooqran 
Ahmad Naji al-Sarari 
Mohammad Mahmood Safian 
Mohammad ‘Abad al- Shajri 

Representatives of Ansar Allah and the General People's Congress:
Abdu Salah al-Salami 
‘Abdu Salah al-Mashraqi 
Murad Ghalib Mazahim 
Na’ran ‘Abdu al-Jalil al-Siadi 
Mohammad Salah al- Niham 
‘Ali Ahmad al- Siadi 
Mohammad Hussein al- Na’iri 
Sa’id ‘Ali al- ‘Ansoob

Third parties

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Description

Two-tier ceasefire agreement, first calling for a ceasefire and separation of forces, which is verified by a commission. Then, during the second stage, the ceasefire introduces confidence building provisions including an exchange of remains, prisoners, guarantees of rights of citizens, movement of citizens and humanitarian aid, and an exchange of mine maps.

Agreement document

YE_160410_Dhalea Ceasefire_EN.pdf (opens in new tab) | Download PDF

Agreement document (original language)

YE_160410_Dhalea Ceasefire_AR.pdf (opens in new tab)| Download PDF

Local agreement properties

Process type

Formal structured process

Rationale

Similarly to the other ceasefire agreements of 2016, this is part of a sub-set of local agreements as part of a series of identical provincially applied agreements, under a broader national effort. The distinction of local level actors does not seem as clear in this agreement where other agreements have involved religious or southern groups, this describes representatives of the 'two main sides' which can be assumed as the Houthis and the GPC and President Hadi's government. There is similar formality by mention of the powers of the committee in relation to implementation. The agreement is set into two stages which provide for the committee monitoring the ending of military operations and the separation of forces, followed by confidence building measures . There are clear provisions laid out regarding safe and free travel for people and humanitarian supplies. There are provisions for the exchange of the deceased from both sides, which is a detail which does not exist in all other similar agreements around this time, so the practice is generally persistent in relation to this set of agreements but with some slight differences laid out in the texts, depending on the province in question.

Is there a documented link to a national peace process?

Yes

Link to national process: articulated rationale

There is a reference in the text to the original national agreement made on 10/04/2016, while it does not explicitly reference this as the national process the agreement name is indicative, thus it is not directly quoted here but is considered a link. For all of these local ceasefire agreements in the sub-set, there is a provision in the national text which outlines the implementation of a De-escalation and Coordination Committee, which would consist of military and official government individuals with the aim of coordinating with local committees to encourage implementation. It is possible that this presence is always involved across these agreements, whilst not always explicitly mentioned in the text. In this case, there is more reference to 'the committee' directly in reference to the national agreement signed in Saudi Arabia (while this is not always the case across this set of ceasefire agreements).

Name of Locale

Al Dhali'(Ad Dhale) governorate

Nature of Locale

Region

GPS Lat/Long (DD)

13.707094, 44.737615

Participant type

Central state actor
Local armed group

Mediator, facilitator or similar

No mention of mediator or similar

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)

Page 1, Untitled preamble, In the Name of Allah the Merciful

Page 1, Untitled preamble, Praise be to Allah (O, you who believe. Enter in Islam completely, and do not follow the footsteps of Satan. Indeed, he is for you an enemy open.) Peace and blessing be upon His Noble Messenger and upon his family and companions and those after:

Grievance List

Page 1, 2-There will be a full end of all forms of military operations, including advances, retreats, expansions and developments on new places in the general governorate.

Page 1, 2-There will be an end and prohibition of the abuse of citizens and travellers on roads and checkpoints. Their rights will be preserved.

Cattle rustling/banditry

No specific mention.

Social cover

No specific mention.

In the Name of Allah the Merciful

Praise be to Allah (O, you who believe.

Enter in Islam completely, and do not follow the footsteps of Satan.

Indeed, he is for you an enemy open.)

Peace and blessing be upon His Noble Messenger and upon his family and companions and those after:

Based on the agreement signed in South Dhahran in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 10/4/2016 between us as the two sides, the committee agreed on a ceasefire in the Governorate of Dhalea, Saudi Arabia, on 20/4/2016 in the City of Dumet.

It was agreed on the following points:

Firstly:

1-It is confirmed that there will be a ceasefire in all its forms and shapes, starting from (22:00) 10 in the evening of the Wednesday corresponding to 20/4/2016, on all fronts of battle (Maris/Dumet and Hamak/al-Khashiba) and those places of fighting which come under these.

2-There will be a full end of all forms of military operations, including advances, retreats, expansions and developments on new places in the general governorate.

3- The Committee will directly supervise the ceasefire.

4-There has been established a monitoring, control, contact, communication and coordination operations room for the Committee.

Secondly:

After the period of ceasefire, retreats and advances, the following steps will be implemented:

1-The Red Crescent and the Red Cross, or whoever represents them, will facilitate the exchanging of deceased from the two sides, if any.

In addition, these organisations will be protected while doing so.

2-There will be an end and prohibition of the abuse of citizens and travellers on roads and checkpoints.

Their rights will be preserved.

3-There will be facilitation of the passage and entry of humanitarian aid and relief.

Their distribution will be supervised.

4-The mine maps will be delivered to the military members in the Committee.

In the case [these maps] are not found, their location will be determined.

5-The Prisoners Committee will return the prisoners and process the list of prisoners and detainees from both sides.

It will also coordinate the final steps of their release with the Central Prisoner’s Committee.

Side 1:

Ahmad ‘Abadi al-Mu’akar

Mohammad Ghalib al- Dhahiri

Lieutenant Colonel ‘Ail ‘Abdu al- Ghriani

Tahir ‘Abad al-Assad

Feysal Satah Shooqran

Ahmad Naji al-Sarari

Mohammad Mahmood Safian

Mohammad ‘Abad al- Shajri

Side 2:

Abdu Salah al-Salami

‘Abdu Salah al-Mashraqi

Murad Ghalib Mazahim

Na’ran ‘Abdu al-Jalil al-Siadi

Mohammad Salah al- Niham

‘Ali Ahmad al- Siadi

Mohammad Hussein al- Na’iri

Sa’id ‘Ali al- ‘Ansoob