Agreement between Ahrar al-Sham (AAS) and Farqa 13

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Country/entity: Syria
Region: Middle East and North Africa
Agreement name: Agreement between Ahrar al-Sham (AAS) and Farqa 13
Date: 22 May 2016
Agreement status: Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement: Yes
Agreement/conflict level: Intrastate/local conflict
Syrian Conflicts (1948 - ) (1976 - 2005) (2011 - )
The agreements relate to three different conflict contexts. Israel-Syria and Syria-Lebanon. The Syrian-Israeli conflict was a key factor for the Syrian intervention during the Lebanese Civil War, with Syrian-backed Palestinian Liberation Army units intervened in 1976 against the Palestinian/Leftist militias. Following a massacre at Tel al-Zaatar that year, Syria was forced to accept a ceasefire at a meeting of the Arab League. However, the Arab League also mandated an Arab Deterrence Force, consisting of mostly Syrian soldiers with token contributions from other Arab League states, thus further legitimizing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. During a second bout of fighting that began in 1989, caused by the formation of rival Lebanese regimes in East and West Beirut, the Syrian-backed regime won and in 1991 the ‘Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination’ was signed to legalize the Syrian occupation as a means to ensure the security of Syria. Syrian forces were forced to withdraw in 2005 following possible involvement in the assassination of Lebanon’s President Hariri.

Syria-internal. In 2011, domestic upheaval following a wave of protests across the Arab World soon led to violent repression of protestors by Syrian government troops. The violence progressed steadily and by July 2011 the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed consisting of defected military units and new recruits. The FSA and rebel umbrella group known as the Syrian National Council represented the first attempt at coordinating rebel factions in late 2011. However, a steady influx of foreign fighters and increased sectarianism radicalised opposition groups, which relied on foreign funding. The nature of the conflict changed drastically in late 2013 as infighting among the opposition groups increased. One of the more significant developments was the split between the al-Qaeda outfits the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, ISIS), and Jabhat al-Nusra in early 2014 in addition to the intensified targeting of other rebel factions by ISIS fighters in particular, including the Kurdish Peshmerga, the FSA and other jihadist outfits. Since the summer of 2014, the conflict was further internationalized when ISIS announced the formation of an Islamic state eroding the state line between Iraq and Syria and also in mid-2015 when Russian forces intervened on behalf of the Bashar al-Assad government in Damascus.
Stage: Ceasefire/related
Conflict nature: Inter-group
Peace process: Syrian Local Agreements
Parties: Jabhat al-Nusra [illegible]
Al-Farqa 13 [illegible]
Third parties: Witness one [illegible]
Witness two [illegible]
Description: Short ceasefire agreement, prohibiting attacks on each other's held areas, an end to provocations over social media, and the understanding that Sheikh Ahmed 'Alwan's comments are personal and not on behalf of Farqa 13.

Agreement document: SY_160522_Agreement between Ahrar al-Sham and Farqa 13_EN.pdf (opens in new tab) | Download PDF
Agreement document (original language): SY_160522_Agreement between Ahrar-al Sham and Farqa 13_AR.pdf (opens in new tab)| Download PDF

Local agreement properties

Process type: Isolated example
Rationale: -> Local issues only; no external support mechanism; no culture of signing An agreement signed between a Salafi-Jihad group and a nationalist Syrian group is quite rare in the Syrian context due to the ideological divide. It is not possible to point to a culture of signing agreements to solve recurring issues between the two groups.
Is there a documented link to a national peace process?: No
Link to national process: articulated rationale: No link to the national peace process in Syria is mentioned in the agreement, neither it can be inferred from further research. First, the agreement does not involve local governance actors; and the signing parties themselves are not official state representative. Second, all parties to the agreement reject the national peace process, as it would maintain Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government in power.
Name of Locale: NA
Nature of Locale: City
GPS Lat/Long (DD): 35.647738, 36.679187
Participant type: Local armed group
Mediator, facilitator or similar: No mention of mediator or similar

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture): Page 1, In the name of Allah the Merciful

Page 1, By the presence and approval of Allah, Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Farqa 13 have agreed to represent the two sides by pledging the following.
Grievance List: Although the agreement does not refer to specific causes of the conflict, it lists three provisions to address local grievances.

Page 1,
Firstly: There will be no attacks on the headquarters or people until the ruling of the unison committee is released and concluded.
Secondly: There will be a cease of provocations on social media such as Twitter and [similar platforms] and of protests and [similar actions] on the ground until the ruling of the unison committee is released and concluded.
Thirdly: The remarks of Sheikh Ahmed ‘Alwan are considered personal remarks that he is responsible for, and al-Farqa 13 do not take the consequences of these.
Cattle rustling/banditry: No specific mention.
Social cover: No specific mention.

Agreement text between Jabhat al-Nusra [The Victory Front] and al-Farqa 13 [Brigade 13]

By the presence and approval of Allah, Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Farqa 13 have agreed to represent the two sides by pledging the following:

Firstly:

There will be no attacks on the headquarters or people until the ruling of the unison committee is released and concluded.

Secondly:

There will be a cease of provocations on social media such as Twitter and [similar platforms] and of protests and [similar actions] on the ground until the ruling of the unison committee is released and concluded.

Thirdly:

The remarks of Sheikh Ahmed ‘Alwan are considered personal remarks that he is responsible for, and al-Farqa 13 do not take the consequences of these.

Jabhat al-Nusra [illegible]

Al-Farqa 13 [illegible]

Witness one [illegible]

Witness two [illegible]