

Country/entity	Yemen
Region	Middle East and North Africa
Agreement name	Agreement between Ansar Allah and Salafists from the al-Noor Centre
Date	26 Jun 2014
Agreement status	Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement	Yes

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 -)

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

Stage	Pre-negotiation/process
Conflict nature	Inter-group
Peace process	Yemen Inter-group Agreements
Parties	The first side: Mr Abd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, signed by his representative, Yusuf Abdallah for Ansar Allah [The Houthis] The second side: Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Imam [for the Salafists of the Noor Center]
Third parties	-
Description	Short agreement between the Houthis (Ansar Allah) and the Salafists at the Noor Centre following the defeat and expulsion of the Salafists at Dar al-Hadith Centre in Dammaj, Sa'dah. Agreement postulates that all involved are Muslims, calls for reconciliation and open lines of communication between the groups to coordinate in the face of strife, guarantees cultural freedom and freedom of thought, and calls for an end to hostile rhetoric by both parties.

Agreement document [YE_140626_Agreement between Salafists and Ansar Allah_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

Agreement document (original language) [YE_140626_Agreement between Salafists and Ansar Allah_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

Local agreement properties

Process type	Informal but persistent process
Rationale	The common local practice of appealing to mutually held religious values and identities among fighting sides has a strong presence in this agreement. Additionally, the clear culture around representatives being present in the process, including sheikhs is also a prominent feature in the agreement text. The agreement also carries many of the same values that other local agreements at this time involve. This primarily involves freedom of expression, countering aggressive language or speech aimed at other groups, and encouraging cultural freedoms and cooperation among traditionally opposing groups for the benefit of the area/region.
Is there a documented link to a national peace process?	T
Link to national process: articulated rationale	The wider peace process is not specifically mentioned in the text. There is also no further research which indicates a clear structural link to the national peace process.

Name of Locale	Dammaj, Sa'dah governorate
Nature of Locale	Region
GPS Lat/Long (DD)	16.896582, 43.800934
Participant type	Local armed group
Mediator, facilitator or similar	Mediator or similar referred to
Mediator (references)	No reference in the text to a mediator or other type of convening/supporting body, with only reference to the representatives of the two sides signing.
Type of mediator/facilitator/similar	

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)	<p>Page 1, Untitled Preamble: You shall hold fast to the rope of Allah, all of you, and do not be divided.</p> <p>Page 1, Paragraph 1: Praise be to Allah, who says 'believers are brothers', believe in Allah, pray, and blessing upon our master, Muhammad, and on the ones who are pure, and Allah is pleased with his good companions of migrants, supporters and followers, and those that follow them charitably.</p> <p>Page 1, Paragraph 2: We are all Muslims with one Lord, one book, one Prophet, and one Enemy. If we differ on the subdetails of Islam, it dispossesses us of our blood, our symptoms and our finances over each other as Muslims.</p> <p>Page 1, This is what was agreed upon, and Allah is behind its intention.</p>
Grievance List	<p>[Summary] (1) lack of unity among Muslims and indifference caused by disagreement around the elements/stipulations of Islam which has caused cultural and financial losses (2) Cultural freedoms and freedom of expression and thinking must be ensured (3) aggressive rhetoric in all forms and in all areas must cease</p>
Cattle rustling/ banditry	No specific mention.
Social cover	No specific mention.
