Agreement between the Tribes of ʿUbaydah and Ansar Allah

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Country/entity: Yemen
Region: Middle East and North Africa
Agreement name: Agreement between the Tribes of ʿUbaydah and Ansar Allah
Date: 4 Dec 2014
Agreement status: Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement: Yes
Agreement/conflict level: Intrastate/local conflict
Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )
The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh’s General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah (‘reform’) party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People’s Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen’s traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen’s peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa’dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi’a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern ‘al-Hiraak’ movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana’a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year deadlock ensued until negotiations between the Houthis and the government of Yemen finally culminated in the Stockholm Agreement in December 2018. However, throughout 2019 the Saudi-led coalition continues to launch airstrikes. Furthermore, in May 2017 the Southern al-Hiraak movement had declared the secessionist formation of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), seizing the interim-capital Aden by January 2018. Territorial divisions between the Yemeni government, the Houthis, forces affiliated with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, local militias and tribes have continued to fracture the country.
Stage: Framework/substantive - partial
Conflict nature: Inter-group
Peace process: Yemen Inter-group Agreements
Parties: Ansar Allah (the Houthis) as the first party and the 'Ubaydah Tribes and those under their auspices in Ma’rib governorate from the valley to the city as the second party
Third parties: -
Description: Agreement between the Ubaydah tribes in the wadi and medina districts of Ma'rib, central Yemen and Ansar Allah (the Houthis) three months after the occupation of Sana'a by the Houthis. Agreement guarantees access and secures infrastructure facilities by the local tribes.

Agreement document: YE_141204_Agreement between the Ubaydah Tribes and Ansar Allah_EN.pdf (opens in new tab) | Download PDF
Agreement document (original language): YE_141204_Agreement between the Ubaydah Tribes and Ansar Allah_AR.pdf (opens in new tab)| Download PDF

Local agreement properties

Process type: Formal structured process
Rationale: The practice of a body of societal figureheads and tribal seniors representing the wider tribe and the people in the region they protect is a clear formally established local practice which also exists in this arrangement. The support from this body for the agreement seems clear, as they pledge to 'exert' all possible efforts in representing the tribal party to the agreement. This seems particularly decisive given the context of the original positions of the Abidah and Murad tribes. As two of the most powerful of the Ma'rib tribes, they originally formed an unlikely alliance putting aside historical differences to mount a resistance against Ansar Allah at the beginning of the conflict. There is a clear non-state element to this process with Ma'rib tribes being clear in their commitments to seek self governance, pushing for self representation in negotiations, with less concern around the control or authority of Hadi's central government. There is also a level of locally formalised practice in the agreement provisions in the form of mutual understanding around assurances that roads will be safely accessible, along with public infrastructure and that certain areas will be recognised as safe spaces immune from violent acts.
Is there a documented link to a national peace process?: T
Link to national process: articulated rationale: The wider peace process is not specifically mentioned in the text. There is also no further research which indicates a clear structural link to the national peace process.
Name of Locale: Wadi and Medina districts of Ma'rib
Nature of Locale: Region
GPS Lat/Long (DD): 15.473768, 45.321942
Participant type: Local armed group
Domestic religious organisation/leader or other elder
Mediator, facilitator or similar: Mediator or similar referred to
Mediator (references): No clear reference to a mediator or actor playing a supporting role of any kind. The representatives of the tribal party will not be considered as such, in view of the fact that as part of the broader tribal/regional network, their interests are involved and they are still clearly part of one side in the agreement.
Type of mediator/facilitator/similar

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture): Page 1, Untitled Preamble: In the name of him, the gracious, the merciful Praise be upon him, and prayer, and peace be upon his Prophet, and the God of the good and virtuous
Grievance List: Page 1, Untitled Preamble: as well as to what this governorate has suffered in the past in regards to a denial of development, a lack of security and stability

[Summary] (1) A general effort by both parties to co-exist peacefully in conditions of cooperation, mutual respect, good relations and with recognition of brotherhood; (2) The securing of roads by the second party (Abidah tribes) for the first party (Ansar Allah/Houthis) and the second party will lead the enforcement of this, with all groups condemning any other group who launches an attack on the road; (3) The second party will ensure the security of public infrastructures and supplies, including: oil, gas, electricity and any other production; (4) The second party is expected to secure the roads from active banditry, preventing attacks or the creation of checkpoints. This will be part of ensuring that Muslims are not robbed, that travellers are not intimidated and public and private properties are safe from theft; (5) The second party must end affiliation with al-Qaeda and actively make efforts to cease assisting or supporting the group in any way; (6) use of Shari'ah to encourage the two parties to exist side by side with tolerance, freedom of expression and in peace; (7) all parties agree that areas and villages that have pledged involvement in this agreement must be viewed as areas free of fighting and the first party will not attack these areas, unless agreed upon with the other party; (8) If any of the terms set out are broken by any tribe or other faction, all groups involved in the agreement will be held responsible; (9) Every party involved recognises the right to freedom of expression and opinion by their members and this will not have any adverse impact on the party; (10) Both parties recognise that the agreement does not absolve provincial security and military officials from their responsibility of securing the province; (11) The first party will support the second party in securing outstanding monies on the basis of land rights and laws; (12) The first party will ensure the preservation of private property belonging to anyone who signs the agreement; (13) The first party more generally commits to begin renewed relations with any group that signs the agreement.
Cattle rustling/banditry: Page 2, Fourth: The second party is committed to secure the road and prevent any attacks or establish checkpoints or sectors in their country to rob Muslims, loot public and private property or intimidate travellers.
Social cover: Page 2, Fifth: Fifth: The second party is committed not to accept al-Qaeda, include them, or provide them with assistance or support because they are a great danger to people and the country.

Agreement between the Tribes of ʿAbidah and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

4 December 2014

In the name of him, the gracious, the merciful

Praise be upon him, and prayer, and peace be upon his Prophet, and the God of the good and virtuous

Given the great challenges that are currently going on in our homeland, which requires concerted efforts and serious cooperation by everyone for the good of the nation and the people.

Furthermore, to establish the principles of brotherhood, peace1 and agreement between all and which he imposes upon us religion and knowledge, and after the success of the popular revolution and the desire of everyone to turn a new page among the spectrum of Yemeni society to bestow on it peace, harmony, respect and peaceful coexistence between all groups without any discrimination and the presentation of the agreement between Ansar as the first party and the ʿAbidah Tribes and those under their auspices in Ma’rib governorate from the valley to the city as the second party representing their people are societal notables at the head of the tribes and who by their hands will exert every conceivably effort.

And so on a number of important points established in the next stage, and so free from problems and difficulties between the children of the unified nation for all citizens to enjoy in safety, peace and stability and what represents the Ma’rib governorate in its geographical, economic, societal, and historical distinctness in addition to what this governorate has suffered in past eras in regards to a denial of development, a lack of security and stability, have agreed to the following:-

First:

Co-existence between the first and second parties in an atmosphere of brotherhood, peace, harmony and relations of cooperation, good faith, and respect for each other.

Second:

The second side commits to secure the roads for the first party as they would for the sons of all Yemeni people from any assault or exposure by either of the two sides or another.

In case of any attack on the first party where the second party is silent, they will leave it for the second side to take action and provide protection and security from any aggression.

Whoever commits an aggression will be charged2 by everyone.

Third:

The second side commits to make sincere and serious efforts in securing facilities and public goods such as oil, gas, electricity and service facilities or other production.

In the case of non- compliance with this requirement, the first party is entitled to secure them and open the roads.

Fourth:

The second party is committed to secure the road and prevent any attacks or establish checkpoints or sectors in their country to rob Muslims, loot public and private property or intimidate travellers.

Fifth:

The second party is committed not to accept al-Qaeda, include them, or provide them with assistance or support because they are a great danger to people and the country.

Sixth:

Both sides commit to each other harmony and cohesion and to live in peace and also with freedom of thought and belief in light of Shari’ah without hostility of coercion from any party towards the other, and all are committed to refrain from incitement and spreading rumours that harm the unity of social fabric.

Seventh:

All agree that the areas and villages committed to this agreement are considered peaceful areas and the first party will not attack them unless except when it is clear what has been agreed upon.3

Eighth:

Everyone agrees that in the case any of the above items are breached by any tribe or house then everyone will be responsible.

Ninth:

All parties commit to the freedom to express his opinion peacefully and this is generally accepted without detriment to the party.

Tenth:

The parties agree that the articles of this agreement will not repeal or absolve the security and military authorities from doing their job and their role in maintaining security and stability in the province.

Eleventh:

The first party commits to stand by the second party in their lawful and fair outstanding monies and in their monies from land rights, which is produced from wealth under the rules of law.

Twelfth:

The first party is committed to the preservation of private property to all those that sign the document.

Thirteenth:

In the case of signing and committing to the articles of this agreement, the first party commits to turn a fresh page in regards to any individual or group and begin good relations between them and any other groups and signatories of this document (as an honoured document) to thereby ease the minds and help [create] a peaceful, gracious, strong and a brotherly co-existence between all parties and signatories4.

And upon this it is signed

[no signatures on website version]