

<b>Country/entity</b>	Chad Sudan
<b>Region</b>	Africa (excl MENA)
<b>Agreement name</b>	Doha Agreement
<b>Date</b>	3 May 2009
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes

**Agreement/conflict level** Interstate/intrastate conflict(s)

### **Chadian Conflicts (1966 - )**

The political history of Chad has been defined by ethno-religious conflict following independence from France in 1960, particularly between the Islamic north and the Christian and animist south. Although prevalent during the colonial era, this became particularly apparent under Tombalbaye during his 15-year rule (1960-1975), which saw mass discrimination against the Muslim northern and central regions. In 1966, the Islamist National Liberation Front on Chad (FROLINAT) was formed, but the movement was defined by factionalism and in-fighting, often encouraged by Libyan government policies, until the civil war ended in 1993. In 1975 Tombalbaye was killed during a coup, and the country reverted to military rule. Constant pressure from the various FROLINAT factions, however, caused then-ruler General Felix Malloum to align himself with Hissene Habre, a rebel leader formerly-aligned with FROLINAT, but then-commander of the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN). In 1978, Libyan troops also occupied the Aouzou Strip (See Libyan-Chadian Conflict). Meanwhile, Habre's FROLINAT competitor, Goukouni Oueddei, gathered the majority of the northern insurgent factions, and the ensuing civil war between 11 factions eroded the capabilities of the state. In 1979, the Lagos Accords created a unity government (GUNT) that briefly convened the factions, but infighting between Habre and Goukouni's forces broke out soon after.

Habre finally gained control of N'Djamena in 1982, but faced continuing insurgent pressure from GUNT. This changed in the mid-1980s when all forces in Chad aligned themselves against the Libyan occupation and expelled them from Chad. Infighting in Habre's regime, meanwhile, saw the defection of General Idriss Deby to Sudan, where he launched a Zaghawa campaign against the President and took the capital in December 1990 with Libyan-backing. Deby was announced President in early 1991, and to ease fighting he announced elections, which he won, in 1996. A number of short-lived peace deals were signed with several rebel factions in 1997, but fighting continued. In 2003, an influx of over 200,000 refugees from Darfur complicated the matter further, and in 2005 Chad declared war on Sudan, which was backing the Chadian rebel group, Rally for Democracy and Liberty. A series of battles ensued across Chad culminating in the Battle of N'Djamena in 2008. The latest war ended in 2010 with a peace accord signed between Sudan and Chad.

In 2021, the FACT (Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad: Front for Change and Concord in Chad) attacked the Chadian military on the eve of presidential elections. President Idriss Déby was killed in the attack, and the army formed a Transitional Military Council (TMC).

Close

Chadian Conflicts (1966 - )

### **Sudan Conflicts (1955 - )**

Agreements relate to several distinct dyads, and also the negotiated independence of South Sudan, and subsequent internal conflict in South Sudan. Sudan-South Sudan. The long-standing conflict between the north and the south of the country dates back to colonial times, where the British introduced a so-called 'Southern Policy', severely hampering population movements between these big regions. Immediately after gaining independence in 1956, southern movements started to fight for independence; this fight became professionalised in 1983 with the foundation of the soon internationally supported Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). When the Islamic Front government introduced strict sharia laws in the south after it took over power in 1988 the war

<b>Stage</b>	Implementation/renegotiation
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Territory
<b>Peace process</b>	Chad-Sudan Agreements
<b>Parties</b>	Moussa Faki Mahamat, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chad; Al-Tijani Salih Fidail, Minister for International Cooperation of the Republic of the Sudan
<b>Third parties</b>	[Agreement does not indicate role of Third Parties, however text does indicate 'Thanks to the efforts of [...]'; 'With the participation of [...]'; 'thanks for the efforts of the State of Qatar in hosting this meeting'] Musa M. Abdussalam Kousa, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 'and Chairperson of the African Union'; Ahmed bin Abdullah Al Mahmud, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Member of the Council of Ministers of the State of Qatar
<b>Description</b>	An agreement that pledges to implement the previously negotiated agreements between the two States, with the parties reaffirming their determination to not interfere in the internal affairs of the other State, to cease hostile media campaigns against the other, to refrain from use of force, and to not support hostile, armed elements in either State. The Parties also invite the State of Qatar to the contact group, and request an urgent plan for joint protection forces and monitoring mechanisms.

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**Agreement document** [SD\\_TD\\_090503\\_DohaAgreement.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

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### Groups

<b>Children/youth</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Disabled persons</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Elderly/age</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Migrant workers</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Racial/ethnic/ national group</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Religious groups</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Indigenous people</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Other groups</b>	No specific mention.

**Refugees/displaced persons** No specific mention.

**Social class** No specific mention.

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**Gender**

**Women, girls and gender** No specific mention.

**Men and boys** No specific mention.

**LGBTI** No specific mention.

**Family** No specific mention.

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## State definition

**Nature of state (general)** No specific mention.

**State configuration** No specific mention.

**Self determination** No specific mention.

**Referendum** No specific mention.

**State symbols** No specific mention.

**Independence/secession** No specific mention.

**Accession/unification** No specific mention.

**Border delimitation** No specific mention.

**Cross-border provision**

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Thanks to the efforts of [...] aimed at:

- Normalizing relations between the Republic of Chad and the Republic of the Sudan and strengthening brotherly relations between them;
- Implementing all provisions of the agreements concluded between the countries, in particular the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006, the Khartoum Framework Agreement and its additional protocols of 28 August 2006, the Riyadh Agreement of 3 May 2007 and the Dakar Agreement of 13 March 2008;
- Creating a climate of trust and the proper conditions for the holding of a summit in Tripoli, Libya, between the Presidents of the two countries.

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1. The parties pledge to hasten the implementation of the aforementioned agreements in order to re-establish a climate of trust and good-neighbourliness between them;

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2. The parties reaffirm their determination not to interfere in one another's internal affairs and to refrain from supporting any armed group that is hostile to the other party. They shall also strive to implement fully the aforementioned agreements concluded between the parties, as well as those to which they were witnesses or guarantors;

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3. The parties pledge to refrain from using force or threatening the use of force against one another;

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4. The parties pledge to revitalize their diplomatic relations so as to serve the interests of their brotherly peoples;

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6. The parties affirm their commitment to end hostile media campaigns and encourage a positive media discourse that leads to the strengthening of brotherly ties and harmony;

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The parties expressed their appreciation for the efforts of His Majesty Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani and Colonel Muammar Al-Qadhafi and for their roles in the efforts aimed normalizing relations between the brotherly countries.

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**Governance**

**Political institutions (new or reformed)**

No specific mention.

**Elections**

No specific mention.

<b>Electoral commission</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Political parties reform</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Civil society</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Traditional/religious leaders</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Public administration</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Constitution</b>	No specific mention.

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#### **Power sharing**

<b>Political power sharing</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Territorial power sharing</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Economic power sharing</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Military power sharing</b>	No specific mention.

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#### **Human rights and equality**

<b>Human rights/RoL general</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Bill of rights/similar</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Treaty incorporation</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Civil and political rights</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Socio-economic rights</b>	No specific mention.

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## **Rights related issues**

<b>Citizenship</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Democracy</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Detention procedures</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Media and communication</b>	Rights related issues→Media and communication→Media roles Page 3, The Doha Agreement 6. The parties affirm their commitment to end hostile media campaigns and encourage a positive media discourse that leads to the strengthening of brotherly ties and harmony;
<b>Mobility/access</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Protection measures</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Other</b>	No specific mention.

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## **Rights institutions**

<b>NHRI</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Regional or international human rights institutions</b>	No specific mention.

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## **Justice sector reform**

<b>Criminal justice and emergency law</b>	No specific mention.
<b>State of emergency provisions</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Judiciary and courts</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Prisons and detention</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Traditional Laws</b>	No specific mention.

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## **Socio-economic reconstruction**

**Development or socio-economic reconstruction** No specific mention.

**National economic plan** No specific mention.

**Natural resources** No specific mention.

**International funds** No specific mention.

**Business** No specific mention.

**Taxation** No specific mention.

**Banks** No specific mention.

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## **Land, property and environment**

**Land reform/rights** No specific mention.

**Pastoralist/nomadism rights** No specific mention.

**Cultural heritage** No specific mention.

**Environment** No specific mention.

**Water or riparian rights or access** No specific mention.

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## **Security sector**

### **Security Guarantees**

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3. The parties pledge to refrain from using force or threatening the use of force against one another;

Page 3, The Doha Agreement

5. The parties request the contact group established pursuant to the Dakar Agreement should convene urgently in order to adopt and implement a plan of action to complete immediately the deployment of monitors and joint protection forces. The parties recommend the addition of the State of Qatar to the contact group, because of its effective efforts aimed at achieving peace in the region, and the establishment, if needed, of new observation posts by both parties. They also recommend that the States supporting the present Agreement should strive urgently to provide the financial and logistical support required for the deployment of the monitors and protection forces for a period of one year, with the possibility of an extension, should that be required;

### **Ceasefire**

No specific mention.

### **Police**

No specific mention.

### **Armed forces**

No specific mention.

### **DDR**

No specific mention.

### **Intelligence services**

No specific mention.

### **Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces**

No specific mention.

### **Withdrawal of foreign forces**

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### **Corruption**

No specific mention.

### **Crime/organised crime**

No specific mention.

**Drugs** No specific mention.

**Terrorism** No specific mention.

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## **Transitional justice**

**Transitional justice general** No specific mention.

**Amnesty/pardon** No specific mention.

**Courts** No specific mention.

**Mechanism** No specific mention.

**Prisoner release** No specific mention.

**Vetting** No specific mention.

**Victims** No specific mention.

**Missing persons** No specific mention.

**Reparations** No specific mention.

**Reconciliation** No specific mention.

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## **Implementation**

**UN signatory** No specific mention.

**Other international signatory** [Agreement does not indicate role of Third Parties, however text does indicate 'Thanks to the efforts of [...]' and 'With the participation of [...]'] Musa M. Abdussalam Kousa, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 'and Chairperson of the African Union'; Ahmed bin Abdullah Al Mahmud, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Member of the Council of Ministers of the State of Qatar

**Referendum for agreement** No specific mention.

**International mission/force/similar**

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**Enforcement mechanism**

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8. The parties shall submit any dispute concerning the interpretation of provisions of the present Agreement to arbitration with a view to its resolution;

**Related cases**

No specific mention.

**Source**

Peacemaker.un.org,. 2015. 'UN Peacemaker'. <http://peacemaker.un.org>.