

<b>Country/entity</b>	Georgia Abkhazia
<b>Region</b>	Europe and Eurasia
<b>Agreement name</b>	Protocol of the sixth session of the Coordinating Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides
<b>Date</b>	18 Dec 1998
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes

**Agreement/conflict level** Intrastate/intrastate conflict

### **Georgian Separatist Conflicts (1989 - )**

#### The Abkhazia-Georgia Conflict (1992 - )

Much like other conflicts that sprung up in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Abkhazia conflict emerged as an ethnic conflict following heightened nationalist awareness among Abkhaz and other minorities residing in the region. In 1978, protests against the Georgianization of Abkhazia emerged from Abkhaz intellectuals. Towards the end of the 1980s, both Georgian and Abkhaz nationalists demanded independence from the Soviet Union. Tensions began following clashes at Sukhumi University between pro-Unity protestors and Abkhaz nationalists in April-July 1989. However, the conflict remained a legal conflict up until August 1992 following the 1991 elections, wherein Abkhazians felt they were under-represented. War broke out between Abkhaz separatists, supported by Russian forces and hired fighters from the North Caucasus. Within Abkhazia, Abkhaz separatists were generally supported by ethnically Armenian and Russian residents. Within Georgia the conflict was exacerbated following conflict in South Ossetia from 1989 onwards in addition to political strife between the supporters of the ousted president, Zviad Gamsakurdia, and the post-coup government led by Eduard Shevardnadze.

Significant human rights abuses occurred, particularly after the capture of Sukhumi in September 1993, after which Georgian residents, which consisted of 45 per cent of the population in 1989, were faced with mass expulsion and ethnic cleansing. Russian Peacekeepers acting under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), were deployed on the Abkhazia-Georgia line following a ceasefire in 1994. Atrocities towards ethnic Georgian's continued with over 1,500 deaths post-conflict. In 1998 fighting re-erupted following a flare up of fighting in South Ossetia. Again it was resolved with a ceasefire agreement. However, as of 2016 the conflict remains unresolved.

#### The Russo-Georgian War (South Ossetia) (1989 - )

Following heightened nationalist awareness among Ossetians and policies undertaken at the expense of ethnic minorities by the Georgian government led by President Gamsakurdia, calls for Ossetian Independence increased. After clashes broke out in Tskhinvali during a pro-Georgia protest, the conflict began to militarize. When President Gamsakurdia maintained his position after elections in 1990, which were boycotted by South Ossetia, Ossetians organised elections for their own parliament. The central Georgian government reacted by abolishing the autonomous status previously held by South Ossetia. The formation of ethnic militias and increased attacks on civilians escalated on both sides and in December 1990 a state of emergency and an economic blockade were declared. Fighting was haphazard as fighters on both sides were poorly equipped and disciplined. The Georgian National Guard was primarily formed of volunteers due to a lack of resources and as a result fighters often acted out of self-interest. Assaults on Tskhinvali by Georgian forces were repulsed on several occasions, and Georgian forces were also noted to expel Ossetian residents and destroy villages out of revenge and as a means to re-claim territory.

The Sochi agreement (1992) established a ceasefire and security corridor, as well as divided the territory between Georgian and Ossetian administration. Relations deteriorated drastically in April 2008, and following shelling of Georgian villages on August 1, the Georgian military responded in force retaking most of Tskhinvali by August 7. Russian forces intervened on behalf of Ossetian separatists and after retaking Tskhinvali, opened another front in the Kodori Gorge. A ceasefire was brokered on August

<b>Stage</b>	Pre-negotiation/process
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Government/territory
<b>Peace process</b>	Abkhazia peace process
<b>Parties</b>	The Georgian side was represented by the delegation led by Mr. Vazha Lordkipanidze. The Abkhaz side was represented by the delegation led by Mr. Sergei Bagapsh.
<b>Third parties</b>	UN (Chair), Russian Federation (Facilitator), OSCE, Group of Friends of the UNSG (France, Germany, Russian Federation, UK, US) as observers
<b>Description</b>	Meeting taking place against backdrop of rapidly deteriorating security situation (preamble). Adopted agenda of non-resumption of hostilities and security problems, refugees and IDPs, and economic and social problems. Parties commit to decisive measures to implement commitments.

---

**Agreement document**      [GE\\_981218\\_Protocol of the 6th Session.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

---

#### Groups

<b>Children/youth</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Disabled persons</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Elderly/age</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Migrant workers</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Racial/ethnic/national group</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Religious groups</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Indigenous people</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Other groups</b>	No specific mention.

**Refugees/displaced persons** Groups→Refugees/displaced persons→Rhetorical  
Page 2, The Abkhaz side stated that it is unilaterally starting the process of return of refugees to the Gali district and called on the United Nations, the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator, the OSCE, the states belonging to the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General as well as the Georgian side to contribute to this process.

Page 2, The Georgian side noted that the statement by the Abkhaz side on the so called unilateral return of refugees is of a purely declarative nature and in reality does not give an opportunity to implement genuinely the process of return of refugees and displaced persons, since it is well known that the organisation of this process is impossible without creating appropriate required mechanisms and guarantees in which the Georgian side and the international community should take a most active part.

**Social class** No specific mention.

---

## **Gender**

**Women, girls and gender** No specific mention.

**Men and boys** No specific mention.

**LGBTI** No specific mention.

**Family** No specific mention.

---

## **State definition**

**Nature of state (general)** No specific mention.

**State configuration** No specific mention.

**Self determination** No specific mention.

**Referendum** No specific mention.

**State symbols** No specific mention.

**Independence/secession** No specific mention.

**Accession/unification** No specific mention.

**Border delimitation** No specific mention.

**Cross-border provision** No specific mention.

---

## **Governance**

**Political institutions (new or reformed)** No specific mention.

**Elections** No specific mention.

**Electoral commission** No specific mention.

**Political parties reform** No specific mention.

**Civil society** No specific mention.

**Traditional/religious leaders** No specific mention.

**Public administration** No specific mention.

**Constitution** No specific mention.

---

## **Power sharing**

**Political power sharing** No specific mention.

**Territorial power sharing** No specific mention.

**Economic power sharing** No specific mention.

**Military power sharing** No specific mention.

---

## **Human rights and equality**

**Human rights/RoL general** No specific mention.

**Bill of rights/similar** No specific mention.

**Treaty incorporation** No specific mention.

**Civil and political rights** No specific mention.

**Socio-economic rights** No specific mention.

---

## **Rights related issues**

**Citizenship** No specific mention.

**Democracy** No specific mention.

**Detention procedures** No specific mention.

**Media and communication** No specific mention.

**Mobility/access** No specific mention.

**Protection measures** No specific mention.

**Other** No specific mention.

---

## **Rights institutions**

**NHRI** No specific mention.

**Regional or international human rights institutions** No specific mention.

---

## **Justice sector reform**

**Criminal justice and emergency law** No specific mention.

**State of emergency provisions** No specific mention.

**Judiciary and courts** No specific mention.

**Prisons and detention** No specific mention.

**Traditional Laws** No specific mention.

---

## **Socio-economic reconstruction**

**Development or socio-economic reconstruction** No specific mention.

**National economic plan** No specific mention.

**Natural resources** No specific mention.

**International funds** No specific mention.

**Business** No specific mention.

**Taxation** No specific mention.

**Banks** No specific mention.

---

## **Land, property and environment**

**Land reform/rights** No specific mention.

**Pastoralist/nomadism rights** No specific mention.

**Cultural heritage** No specific mention.

**Environment** No specific mention.

**Water or riparian rights or access** No specific mention.

---

**Security sector**

**Security Guarantees** Page 1, Opening the Session, the Special Representative noted that following and facilitated by the Athens Meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures , held from 16 to 18 October 1998 , the sides actively engaged in productive bilateral talks on issues related to: 1) security and the non-use of force, ...

Page 1, The Special Representative continued that this Council session takes place against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating security situation on the ground in the zone of conflict. The situation is extremely dangerous and there is a real risk that the May events might be repeated.

Page 1, The adopted agenda included the following items:

1. Issues related to the lasting non-resumption of hostilities and to security problems .

**Ceasefire** Security sector→Ceasefire→Ceasefire provision  
Page 2, The Council adopted the following decisions:  
... 3. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, should the sides ignore protests concerning violations of the Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as provided for by the Protocol of the Fifth Session of the Council regarding responses to the protests of the representatives of UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force, so that the Secretary-General may put this question for consideration by the Security Council.

**Police** No specific mention.

**Armed forces** No specific mention.

**DDR** No specific mention.

**Intelligence services** No specific mention.

**Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces** No specific mention.

**Withdrawal of foreign forces** No specific mention.

**Corruption** No specific mention.

<b>Crime/organised crime</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Drugs</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Terrorism</b>	Page 2, The Council adopted the following decisions: 2. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall continue and complete consultations with the Sides on the establishment of the Joint Group on Investigation and Prevention of Terrorist Acts and Other Offences, in accordance with the Council's decisions contained in the Protocol of the Fourth (Second Extraordinary) Session (para. 2) and the Protocol of the Fifth Session (para. 2).

---

## **Transitional justice**

<b>Transitional justice general</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Amnesty/pardon</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Courts</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Mechanism</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Prisoner release</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Vetting</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Victims</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Missing persons</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Reparations</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Reconciliation</b>	Page 1, ... While not suggesting that either side failed to negotiate in bona tide, the Special Representative noted that it seems that some misunderstandings arose and the talks stalled. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Special Representative, the positions of the parties on the specific issues dividing them are not irreconcilable, and there is room for the talks to continue.

---

**Implementation**

<b>UN signatory</b>	UN chaired talks; 2. SRSG to continue consultations on establishing Joint Group on investigation and Prevention of Terrorist acts and other Offences. 3. If sides don't respond to protests concerning ceasefire violations, matter to be referred to UNSC.
<b>Other international signatory</b>	with the participation of representatives of the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE), and the States in the group of Friends of the Secretary-General of the United Nations - France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America - as observers
<b>Referendum for agreement</b>	No specific mention.
<b>International mission/force/ similar</b>	Page 2, The Council adopted the following decisions: ... 3. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, should the sides ignore protests concerning violations of the Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as provided for by the Protocol of the Fifth Session of the Council regarding responses to the protests of the representatives of UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force, so that the Secretary-General may put this question for consideration by the Security Council.
<b>Enforcement mechanism</b>	Page 2, The Council adopted the following decisions: 2. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall continue and complete consultations with the Sides on the establishment of the Joint Group on Investigation and Prevention of Terrorist Acts and Other Offences, in accordance with the Council's decisions contained in the Protocol of the Fourth (Second Extraordinary) Session (para. 2) and the Protocol of the Fifth Session (para. 2).  Page 2, The Council adopted the following decisions: ... 3. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, should the sides ignore protests concerning violations of the Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as provided for by the Protocol of the Fifth Session of the Council regarding responses to the protests of the representatives of UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force, so that the Secretary-General may put this question for consideration by the Security Council.  Page 2-3, The Council adopted the following decisions: ... 4. To convene expeditiously, not later than 22 December, in the Gali district, a meeting of authorized representatives of the sides in order to prevent destabilization of the situation in the zone of conflict, to agree on and take effective measures for the implementation of earlier bilateral agreements contained in the Protocol on the Ceasefire and Separation of Armed Units and Guarantees for the Prevention of Acts involving Force of 25 May 1998 and in the Protocol of the Meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on the Stabilization of the Situation along the Line of Separation of Sides, signed in Sukhumi 24 September 1998.
<b>Related cases</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Source</b>	on file with author