Ajmar Agreement

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Country/entity: Yemen
Region: Middle East and North Africa
Agreement name: Ajmar Agreement
Date: 4 Feb 2014
Agreement status: Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement: Yes
Agreement/conflict level: Intrastate/local conflict
Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )
The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh’s General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah (‘reform’) party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People’s Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen’s traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen’s peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa’dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi’a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern ‘al-Hiraak’ movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana’a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year deadlock ensued until negotiations between the Houthis and the government of Yemen finally culminated in the Stockholm Agreement in December 2018. However, throughout 2019 the Saudi-led coalition continues to launch airstrikes. Furthermore, in May 2017 the Southern al-Hiraak movement had declared the secessionist formation of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), seizing the interim-capital Aden by January 2018. Territorial divisions between the Yemeni government, the Houthis, forces affiliated with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, local militias and tribes have continued to fracture the country.
Stage: Ceasefire/related
Conflict nature: Inter-group
Peace process: Yemen Inter-group Agreements
Parties: Signed by the two parties in the Ajmar Nayābita area by Sheikhs of Bani Sarīm Hāshid including Sheikh Ālī Hamīd Jalaydān, Sheikh ‘Adel Hamūd ‘Ataf and other elders, in addition to Ansar Allah representatives and in the presence of dignitaries of Hamdān municipality.
Third parties: -
Description: Short agreement negotiating an end to tensions between Ansar Allah and the Bani Sarim Tribe in Amran. Ansar Allah commit to not undertake military operations in the areas of the Bani Sarim, meanwhile, the Bani Sarim must secure the roads, not prevent of object to the activities of Ansar Allah. The authenticity of the agreement was originally disputed by one of the signatories, Sheikh Ali Jalaydan. However, in later interviews with Shiekh Amin al-Ataf, the Shiekh confirmed the existence of the Ajmar Agreement, which was broken by Ansar Allah quickly after signing.

Agreement document: YE_140204_Ajmar Agreement_EN.pdf (opens in new tab) | Download PDF
Agreement document (original language): YE_140204_Ajmar Agreement_AR.pdf (opens in new tab)| Download PDF

Groups

Children/youth: No specific mention.
Disabled persons: No specific mention.
Elderly/age: No specific mention.
Migrant workers: No specific mention.
Racial/ethnic/national group: No specific mention.
Religious groups: No specific mention.
Indigenous people: No specific mention.
Other groups: No specific mention.
Refugees/displaced persons: No specific mention.
Social class: No specific mention.

Gender

Women, girls and gender: No specific mention.
Men and boys: No specific mention.
LGBTI: No specific mention.
Family: No specific mention.

State definition

Nature of state (general): No specific mention.
State configuration: No specific mention.
Self determination: No specific mention.
Referendum: No specific mention.
State symbols: No specific mention.
Independence/secession: No specific mention.
Accession/unification: No specific mention.
Border delimitation: No specific mention.
Cross-border provision: No specific mention.

Governance

Political institutions (new or reformed): No specific mention.
Elections: No specific mention.
Electoral commission: No specific mention.
Political parties reform: No specific mention.
Civil society: No specific mention.
Traditional/religious leaders: Page 1, Third – It is up to the sheikhs and elders of Bani Sarīm to secure the roads in their area from any disruption or assault.

[Summary: Signed by the two parties in the Ajmar Nayābita area by Sheikhs of Bani Sarīm Hāshid including Sheikh Ālī Hamīd Jalaydān, Sheikh ‘Adel Hamūd ‘Ataf and other elders]
Public administration: No specific mention.
Constitution: No specific mention.

Power sharing

Political power sharing: No specific mention.
Territorial power sharing: No specific mention.
Economic power sharing: No specific mention.
Military power sharing: No specific mention.

Human rights and equality

Human rights/RoL general: No specific mention.
Bill of rights/similar: No specific mention.
Treaty incorporation: No specific mention.
Civil and political rights: No specific mention.
Socio-economic rights: No specific mention.

Rights related issues

Citizenship: No specific mention.
Democracy: No specific mention.
Detention procedures: No specific mention.
Media and communication: No specific mention.
Mobility/access: Page 1, Third – It is up to the sheikhs and elders of Bani Sarīm to secure the roads in their area from any disruption or assault.
Protection measures: No specific mention.
Other: No specific mention.

Rights institutions

NHRI: No specific mention.
Regional or international human rights institutions: No specific mention.

Justice sector reform

Criminal justice and emergency law: No specific mention.
State of emergency provisions: No specific mention.
Judiciary and courts: No specific mention.
Prisons and detention: No specific mention.
Traditional Laws: No specific mention.

Socio-economic reconstruction

Development or socio-economic reconstruction: No specific mention.
National economic plan: No specific mention.
Natural resources: No specific mention.
International funds: No specific mention.
Business: No specific mention.
Taxation: No specific mention.
Banks: No specific mention.

Land, property and environment

Land reform/rights: No specific mention.
Pastoralist/nomadism rights: No specific mention.
Cultural heritage: No specific mention.
Environment: No specific mention.
Water or riparian rights or access: No specific mention.

Security sector

Security Guarantees: No specific mention.
Ceasefire: Security sector→Ceasefire→Ceasefire provision
Page 1, Second – Ansar Allah commit to not undertake military aggression in the areas [of Bani Sarīm] and will reassure them of such.

Page 1, Fourth – The mujahidin will not allow for any evil in the country [of Bani Sarīm] and they [the Bani Sarīm] will not rise up against the mujahidin.

Page 1, Fifth – The sheikhs and elders of Bani Sarīm commit not to attack those that join the Quranic Rally in their country, or their children, and will have faith in itself, its land and its wealth.

Page 1, Sixth – They [Bani Sarīm] wil not object to the peaceful cultural activity of Ansar Allah in their area – [that] like anyone else, [operates] in a peaceful and voluntary framework.
Police: No specific mention.
Armed forces: No specific mention.
DDR: No specific mention.
Intelligence services: No specific mention.
Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces: No specific mention.
Withdrawal of foreign forces: No specific mention.
Corruption: No specific mention.
Crime/organised crime: No specific mention.
Drugs: No specific mention.
Terrorism: No specific mention.

Transitional justice

Transitional justice general: No specific mention.
Amnesty/pardon: No specific mention.
Courts: No specific mention.
Mechanism: No specific mention.
Prisoner release: No specific mention.
Vetting: No specific mention.
Victims: No specific mention.
Missing persons: No specific mention.
Reparations: No specific mention.
Reconciliation: Page 1, First – They [the Bani Sarīm] and Ansar Allah will live in brotherhood, peace and harmony, and a life of cooperation, loyalty and respect.

Implementation

UN signatory: No specific mention.
Other international signatory: No specific mention.
Referendum for agreement: No specific mention.
International mission/force/similar: No specific mention.
Enforcement mechanism: No specific mention.
Related cases: No specific mention.
Source: Yemeress. ‘Key points of the ‘Ajmar Agreement’ between Hashid and Ansar Allah ‘Houthi Movement’ 6 February 2014, https://www.yemeress.com/hshd/26458

Pa-X P

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful

Ajmar Agreement (The Black Line Agreement)

[Preface missing from translation]

First – They [the Bani Sarīm] and Ansar Allah will live in brotherhood, peace and harmony, and a life of cooperation, loyalty and respect.

Second – Ansar Allah commit to not undertake military aggression in the areas [of Bani Sarīm] and will reassure them of such.

Third – It is up to the sheikhs and elders of Bani Sarīm to secure the roads in their area from any disruption or assault.

Fourth – The mujahideen will not allow for any evil in the country [of Bani Sarīm] and they [the Bani Sarīm] will not rise up against the mujahidin.

Fifth – The sheikhs and elders of Bani Sarīm commit not to attack those that join the Quranic Rally in their country, or their children, and will have faith in itself, its land and its wealth.

Sixth – They [Bani Sarīm] wil not object to the peaceful cultural activity of Ansar Allah in their area – [that] like anyone else, [operates] in a peaceful and voluntary framework.

Allah is the Conciliator

Signed 4 February 2014