

| | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Country/entity | Philippines Mindanao |
| Region | Asia and Pacific |
| Agreement name | 1993 Interim Ceasefire Agreement Between the Government of The Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the Participation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) |
| Date | 7 Nov 1993 |
| Agreement status | Multiparty signed/agreed |
| Interim arrangement | Yes |

Agreement/conflict level Intrastate/intrastate conflict

Philippine Insurgencies (1968 -)

The Maoist Insurgencies (1968 -)

Philippines-NDF

The Philippines have been defined by a series of center-periphery and often ideologically Maoist, separatist insurgencies. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), began its war against the central Philippine government in 1968 through their armed wing – the New People’s Army (NPA). Further legitimacy was gained through the establishment of the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1973. Grievances were predominantly opposed to the corruption and repression under the authoritarian Marcos regime.

Philippines-Cordillera

With the overthrow of Marcos’ regime in 1986, the CPP factionalized further to take on more localized characteristics. The Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) broke away from the NDF in 1986 to focus on the protection of the Cordilleran people and land in northern Luzon. Hostilities were formally ended in July 2011, with an agreement signed between the central government, the CPLA and the Cordillera Bodong Administration (CBA) that allowed for the absorption of CPLA fighters into the Philippine Army and the re-working of the CBA-CPLA into a socio-development organisation.

Philippines-RPM-P

Meanwhile, purge among the CPP in the early 1990s, encouraged the formation of a parallel party, the Revolutionary Workers Party (RPM-P). Their armed wing, the Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB) which had carried out a number of assassinations during the 1980s at the bequest of the CPP, followed suit and allied themselves with the RPM-P in 1997 forming the (RPM-P-RPA-ABB). Severely weakened by the split with the CPP and with the arrest of several key figures, the RPM-P-RPA-ABB signed a peace agreement in December 2000, which encouraged the RPM-P’s branch in Mindanao to break away in 2001.

The CPP-NPA has only participated in intermittent talks with the government. Talks halted in 2004 when Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration sought closer ties with the U.S. in the war on terror and added the CPP-NPA to the list of terrorist organisations, renewing violence. Following the launch of a counter-insurgency by the Philippine government, negotiations have been further delayed due to suspected internal differences between the CPP ‘old guard’ and younger members.

The Moro Insurgency (1968 -)

Philippines-Mindanao

The Moro Insurgency began in 1968, in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago after the killing of Moro Commandos, the so-called Jabidah Massacre, by the Philippine Army following a plot to invade Sabah province in Malaysia. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) captured a swath of territory in the mid-1970s. In an attempt to stem the violence, the constitution was reformed and Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created 1990 granting a devolution of power to the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Following the establishment of the ARMM, the MNLF splintered into a range of smaller groups including Islamic factions such as the

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| Stage | Ceasefire/related |
| Conflict nature | Government/territory |
| Peace process | Philippines - Mindanao process |
| Parties | Ambassador Manuel T. Yan, GRP Peace Panel Chairman Professor Nur Misuari, MNLF Peace Panel Chairman |
| Third parties | Ambassador S. Wiryono, Director-General for Political Affairs for the Host Government and the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six Chairman Ambassador Mohammad Mohsin, OIC Assistant Secretary General |
| Description | Agreement to formalize and strengthen the ceasefire, and establishes a Joint Committee to implement the agreement. |

Agreement document [PH_931107 Interim Ceasefire Agreement.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

Groups

Children/youth No specific mention.

Disabled persons No specific mention.

Elderly/age No specific mention.

Migrant workers No specific mention.

Racial/ethnic/national group No specific mention.

Religious groups No specific mention.

Indigenous people No specific mention.

Other groups No specific mention.

Refugees/displaced persons No specific mention.

Social class No specific mention.

Gender

Women, girls and gender No specific mention.

Men and boys No specific mention.

LGBTI No specific mention.

Family No specific mention.

State definition

Nature of state (general) No specific mention.

State configuration No specific mention.

Self determination No specific mention.

Referendum No specific mention.

State symbols No specific mention.

Independence/secession No specific mention.

Accession/unification No specific mention.

Border delimitation No specific mention.

Cross-border provision No specific mention.

Governance

Political institutions (new or reformed) No specific mention.

Elections No specific mention.

Electoral commission No specific mention.

Political parties reform No specific mention.

Civil society No specific mention.

Traditional/religious leaders No specific mention.

Public administration No specific mention.

Constitution No specific mention.

Power sharing

Political power sharing No specific mention.

Territorial power sharing No specific mention.

Economic power sharing No specific mention.

Military power sharing No specific mention.

Human rights and equality

Human rights/RoL general No specific mention.

Bill of rights/similar No specific mention.

Treaty incorporation No specific mention.

Civil and political rights No specific mention.

Socio-economic rights No specific mention.

Rights related issues

| | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| Citizenship | No specific mention. |
| Democracy | No specific mention. |
| Detention procedures | No specific mention. |
| Media and communication | No specific mention. |
| Mobility/access | No specific mention. |
| Protection measures | No specific mention. |
| Other | No specific mention. |

Rights institutions

| | |
|--|----------------------|
| NHRI | No specific mention. |
| Regional or international human rights institutions | No specific mention. |

Justice sector reform

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| Criminal justice and emergency law | No specific mention. |
| State of emergency provisions | No specific mention. |
| Judiciary and courts | No specific mention. |
| Prisons and detention | No specific mention. |
| Traditional Laws | No specific mention. |

Socio-economic reconstruction

Development or socio-economic reconstruction No specific mention.

National economic plan No specific mention.

Natural resources No specific mention.

International funds No specific mention.

Business No specific mention.

Taxation No specific mention.

Banks No specific mention.

Land, property and environment

Land reform/rights No specific mention.

Pastoralist/nomadism rights No specific mention.

Cultural heritage No specific mention.

Environment No specific mention.

Water or riparian rights or access No specific mention.

Security sector

Security Guarantees

No specific mention.

Ceasefire

Security sector→Ceasefire→Ceasefire provision

Page 1, Preamble

WHEREAS, there is an existing informal ceasefire between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police of the GRP, on the one hand, and the Bangsamoro Armed Forces of the MNLF, on the other, [...]

Page 1, 1. To formalize and further strengthen the structure and conduct of the ceasefire which was agreed upon between the erstwhile Philippine President Corazon C. Aquino, and Chairman Nur Misuari of the MNLF. The latter in embarking on the peace process had obtained the Concurrence of the Secretary-General of the OIC. [...]

Page 1, 2. To ensure the successful implementation of this Interim Ceasefire Agreement, the forces of both parties shall remain in their respective places and refrain from any provocative actions or any acts of hostilities contrary to the spirit and purposes of this said Agreement: provided that the representatives of the OIC shall help supervise in the implementation of this Agreement through the Joint Committee;

Page 2, 3. A Joint Committee as provided for in Article III section 12 of the Tripoli Agreement shall be constituted immediately, to be composed of representatives from the GRP and the MNLF with the help of the OIC represented by the Ministerial Committee of the Six;

Page 2, 4. This Joint Committee shall prepare its own detailed guidelines and ground rules for the implementation of this Agreement and submit the same to all parties concerned not later than 30th November 1993 for approval by duly designated representatives of all the parties concerned.

Page 2, 5. This Interim Ceasefire Agreement which shall be linked to the substantial progress of the negotiations shall take effect immediately upon its signing by the parties signatory to it and shall remain valid and enforceable solely for the duration of the Formal Peace Talks, unless otherwise extended by their unanimous decision.

Police

Page 1, Preamble

WHEREAS, there is an existing informal ceasefire between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police of the GRP, on the one hand, and the Bangsamoro Armed Forces of the MNLF, on the other, [...]

Armed forces

Page 1, Preamble

WHEREAS, there is an existing informal ceasefire between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police of the GRP, on the one hand, and the Bangsamoro Armed Forces of the MNLF, on the other, [...]

DDR

No specific mention.

| | |
|---|---|
| Intelligence services | No specific mention. |
| Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces | <p>Page 1, Preamble</p> <p>WHEREAS, there is an existing informal ceasefire between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police of the GRP, on the one hand, and the Bangsamoro Armed Forces of the MNLF, on the other, [...]</p> <p>Page 1, 2. To ensure the successful implementation of this Interim Ceasefire Agreement, the forces of both parties shall remain in their respective places and retrain from any provocative actions or any acts of hostilities contrary to the spirit and purposes of this said Agreement: provided that the representatives of the OIC shall help supervise in the implementation of this Agreement through the Joint Committee;</p> |
| Withdrawal of foreign forces | No specific mention. |
| Corruption | No specific mention. |
| Crime/organised crime | No specific mention. |
| Drugs | No specific mention. |
| Terrorism | No specific mention. |

Transitional justice

| | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Transitional justice general | No specific mention. |
| Amnesty/pardon | No specific mention. |
| Courts | No specific mention. |
| Mechanism | No specific mention. |
| Prisoner release | No specific mention. |
| Vetting | No specific mention. |
| Victims | No specific mention. |
| Missing persons | No specific mention. |

Reparations No specific mention.

Reconciliation No specific mention.

Implementation

UN signatory No specific mention.

Other international signatory Ambassador S. Wiryono, Director-General for Political Affairs for the Host Government and the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six Chairman

Ambassador Mohammad Mohsin, OIC Assistant Secretary General

Referendum for agreement No specific mention.

International mission/force/similar No specific mention.

Enforcement mechanism As Agreement in its entirety is formalizes and strengthens the ceasefire between the Parties, see Ceasefire section for enforcement mechanism.

Related cases No specific mention.

Source UN Peacemaker
<https://peacemaker.un.org/philippines-interimceasefire93>
