The Provisional Mechanism for the Prevention and Settlement of Disputes - Technical Arrangements between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia and the Head of the Mission of the European Union Monitoring Mission

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Country/entity: Georgia
Russia
Abkhazia
Region: Europe and Eurasia
Agreement name: The Provisional Mechanism for the Prevention and Settlement of Disputes - Technical Arrangements between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia and the Head of the Mission of the European Union Monitoring Mission
Date: 3 Nov 2008
Agreement status: Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement: Yes
Agreement/conflict level: Interstate/intrastate conflict(s)
Georgian Separatist Conflicts (1989 - )
The Abkhazia-Georgia Conflict (1992 - )
Much like other conflicts that sprung up in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Abkhazia conflict emerged as an ethnic conflict following heighten nationalist awareness among Abkhaz and other minorities residing in the region. In 1978, protests against the Georgianization of Abkhazia emerged from Abkhaz intellectuals. Towards the end of the 1980s, both Georgian and Abkhaz nationalists demanded independence from the Soviet Union. Tensions began following clashes at Sukhumi University between pro-Unity protestors and Abkhaz nationalists in April-July 1989. However, the conflict remained a legal conflict up until August 1992 following the 1991 elections, wherein Abkhazians felt they were under-represented. War broke out between Abkhaz separatists, supported by Russian forces and hired fighters from the North Caucus. Within Abkhazia, Abkhaz separatists were generally supported by ethnically Armenian and Russian residents. Within Georgia the conflict was exacerbated following conflict in South Ossetia from 1989 onwards in addition to political strife between the supporters of the ousted president, Zviad Gamsakurdia, and the post-coup government led by Eduard Shevardnadze.

Significant human rights abuses occurred, particularly after the capture of Sukhumi in September 1993, after which Georgian residents, which consisted of 45 per cent of the population in 1989, were faced with mass expulsion and ethnic cleansing. Russian Peacekeepers acting under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), were deployed on the Abkhazia-Georgia line following a ceasefire in 1994. Atrocities towards ethnic Georgian’s continued with over 1,500 deaths post-conflict. In 1998 fighting re-erupted following a flare up of fighting in South Ossetia. Again it was resolved with a ceasefire agreement. However, as of 2016 the conflict remains unresolved.

The Russio-Georgian War (South Ossetia) (1989 - )
Following heightened nationalist awareness among Ossetians and policies undertaken at the expense of ethnic minorities by the Georgian government led by President Gamsakurdia, calls for Ossetian Independence increased. After clashes broke out in Tskhinvali during a pro-Georgia protest, the conflict began to militarize. When President Gamsakurdia maintained his position after elections in 1990, which were boycotted by South Ossetia, Ossetians organised elections for their own parliament. The central Georgian government reacted by abolishing the autonomous status previously held by South Ossetia. The formation of ethnic militias and increased attacks on civilians escalated on both sides and in December 1990 a state of emergency and an economic blockade were declared. Fighting was haphazard as fighters on both sides were poorly equipped and disciplined. The Georgian National Guard was primarily formed of volunteers due to a lack of resources and as a result fighters often acted out of self-interest. Assaults on Tskhinvali by Georgian forces were repulsed on several occasions, and Georgian forces were also noted to expel Ossetian residents and destroy villages out of revenge and as a means to re-claim territory.

The Sochi agreement (1992) established a ceasefire and security corridor, as well as divided the territory between Georgian and Ossetian administration. Relations deteriorated drastically in April 2008, and following shelling of Georgian villages on August 1, the Georgian military responded in force retaking most of Tskhinvali by August 7. Russian forces intervened on behalf of Ossetian separatists and after retaking Tskihvali, opened another front in the Kordori Gorge. A ceasefire was brokered on August 12, and the Kremlin declared its recognition of the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on August 26. Russian forces have since strengthened their military presence in those regions in violation of the ceasefire.
Stage: Implementation/renegotiation
Conflict nature: Government/territory
Peace process: Abkhazia peace process
Parties: Minister of Interior of the Government of Georgia Ivane Merabishvili
Third parties: Head of EU Monitoring Mission Ambassador Hansjorg Haber
Description: Agreement outlines dispute and information exchange mechanisms between EU, Georgian and Russian authorities on three levels to adhere to the principles listed. Other clauses emphasise information exchange, the withdrawal of Russian forces, to be exchanged with Georgian police forces - who will be clearly marked, and not have heavy weaponry. The EUMM has the right to inspect at any time.

Agreement document: GE_081010_The Provisional Mechanism for the Prevention and Settlement of Disputes.pdf (opens in new tab) | Download PDF

Groups

Children/youth: No specific mention.
Disabled persons: No specific mention.
Elderly/age: No specific mention.
Migrant workers: No specific mention.
Racial/ethnic/national group: No specific mention.
Religious groups: No specific mention.
Indigenous people: No specific mention.
Other groups: No specific mention.
Refugees/displaced persons: Groups→Refugees/displaced persons→Substantive
Page 1, Untitled Section 1,
The mechanism should provide assurances of stability through information and consultation based on the following principles:
... Normalisation:
... - Return of IDPs
Social class: No specific mention.

Gender

Women, girls and gender: No specific mention.
Men and boys: No specific mention.
LGBTI: No specific mention.
Family: No specific mention.

State definition

Nature of state (general): No specific mention.
State configuration: No specific mention.
Self determination: No specific mention.
Referendum: No specific mention.
State symbols: No specific mention.
Independence/secession: No specific mention.
Accession/unification: No specific mention.
Border delimitation: No specific mention.
Cross-border provision: No specific mention.

Governance

Political institutions (new or reformed): No specific mention.
Elections: No specific mention.
Electoral commission: No specific mention.
Political parties reform: No specific mention.
Civil society: Page 1, Untitled Section 1,
The mechanism should provide assurances of stability through information and consultation based on the following principles:
... Normalisation:
... - Engagement of international aid agencies.
Traditional/religious leaders: No specific mention.
Public administration: No specific mention.
Constitution: No specific mention.

Power sharing

Political power sharing: No specific mention.
Territorial power sharing: No specific mention.
Economic power sharing: No specific mention.
Military power sharing: No specific mention.

Human rights and equality

Human rights/RoL general: Page 1, Untitled Section 1,
The mechanism should provide assurances of stability through information and consultation based on the following principles:
... Normalisation:
... - Return of the rule of law;
Bill of rights/similar: No specific mention.
Treaty incorporation: No specific mention.
Civil and political rights: No specific mention.
Socio-economic rights: No specific mention.

Rights related issues

Citizenship: No specific mention.
Democracy: No specific mention.
Detention procedures: No specific mention.
Media and communication: No specific mention.
Mobility/access: No specific mention.
Protection measures: No specific mention.
Other: No specific mention.

Rights institutions

NHRI: No specific mention.
Regional or international human rights institutions: No specific mention.

Justice sector reform

Criminal justice and emergency law: No specific mention.
State of emergency provisions: No specific mention.
Judiciary and courts: No specific mention.
Prisons and detention: No specific mention.
Traditional Laws: No specific mention.

Socio-economic reconstruction

Development or socio-economic reconstruction: Socio-economic reconstruction→Development or socio-economic reconstruction→Humanitarian assistance
Page 1, Untitled Section 1,
The mechanism should provide assurances of stability through information and consultation based on the following principles:
... Normalisation:
... - Engagement of international aid agencies.
National economic plan: No specific mention.
Natural resources: No specific mention.
International funds: No specific mention.
Business: No specific mention.
Taxation: No specific mention.
Banks: No specific mention.

Land, property and environment

Land reform/rights: No specific mention.
Pastoralist/nomadism rights: No specific mention.
Cultural heritage: No specific mention.
Environment: No specific mention.
Water or riparian rights or access: No specific mention.

Security sector

Security Guarantees: Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... The MoIA will inform EUMM of any arrangements made with the Russian side on security matters, including transit and movement of forces and equipment.
Ceasefire: Security sector→Ceasefire→General commitments
Page 1, Untitled Section 1,
The mechanism should provide assurances of stability through information and consultation based on the following principles:
Stabilisation:
... - Absence of Georgian armed forces from zones adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia;

Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... It is understood that the armed forces of Georgia, which are under the MoD, will not deploy to the areas.

Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... The MoIA will inform EUMM in advance of any deployment of armed vehicles (in particular Cobras) in the direction of and into the areas.
Police: Page 1, Untitled Section 1,
The mechanism should provide assurances of stability through information and consultation based on the following principles:
Stabilisation:
... - Regulation of the presence (if any) of special Georgian police units and prevention of irregular armed groups.

Page 1, Untitled Section 1,
The mechanism should provide assurances of stability through information and consultation based on the following principles:
... Normalisation:
- Return of regular Georgian police to the area;

Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) will inform the EUMM of any forces that it plans to deploy in the zones adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (hereafter referred to as “the areas”), during and following the withdrawal of Russian forces and also on police forces that are already in the areas under Georgian control.

Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... More specifically, MoIA will provide a detailed breakdown of the number of forces for the different locations, including the type of weaponry these police forces have available. This information will cover regular police forces as well as special police forces.

Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... Transparency and predictability will be provided by the MoIA, including through a clear policy of visibility with respect to the uniforms, vehicles and other equipment used by the various police forces. Regular police, including Criminal Investigation Department as well as Special police, will have clearly distinguishable uniforms in order to avoid misunderstandings. Urgent efforts must be made to improve the identification of uniforms and vehicles when the latter resemble army units’, by providing additional and temporary identification, such as highly visible arm bands or badges and vehicle stripes or stickers. Identification marks will be systematically applied and colors will be mutually agreed.

Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... The MoIA commits not to deploy heavy armaments in the areas, not any mortars. The MoIA also commits to strictly control and restrict any deployment of sniper rifles. Sniper rifles will be kept in police offices and may be deployed in the field only in reaction to a direct attack.

Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... The MoIA recognizes the EUMM’s right to perform unannounced inspections on these matters and will inform the police forces of this disposition.

Page 3, Incident Reporting
EUMM and MoIA agree to set up an incident reporting mechanism. In particular, the MoIA will instruct its police forces to report any incident threatening or involving the use of arms to a central point of contact in the MoIA (POC). This POC will report the incident immediately to
EUMM Liaison Officer in the MoIA. EUMM Liaison Officer will similarly report on incidents to MoIA POC.
Armed forces: No specific mention.
DDR: No specific mention.
Intelligence services: No specific mention.
Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces: Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... The MoIA will also provide information to EUMM about any armed irregulars in the areas.
Withdrawal of foreign forces: Page 1, Untitled Section 1,
The mechanism should provide assurances of stability through information and consultation based on the following principles:
Stabilisation:
- Withdrawal of Russian forces;

Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) will inform the EUMM of any forces that it plans to deploy in the zones adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (hereafter referred to as “the areas”), during and following the withdrawal of Russian forces and also on police forces that are already in the areas under Georgian control.
Corruption: Page 1, Exchange of Information and Dispute Settlement:
The mechanism will consist of a system of consultations at three levels:
... 2. At EUMM Head of Mission, Georgian Ministry of Interior level and equivalent Russian counterpart, a mechanism for dealing with transparency, major incidents and disputes.

Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
Both sides agree that the prevention and resolution of conflicts will depend on high level of transparency, to be provided by all sides, as a condition for confidence building measures. It is understood that EUMM will seek transparency on both sides. In this context, the following is agreed.

Page 2, Mechanisms at the Operational level:
... Transparency and predictability will be provided by the MoIA, including through a clear policy of visibility with respect to the uniforms, vehicles and other equipment used by the various police forces. Regular police, including Criminal Investigation Department as well as Special police, will have clearly distinguishable uniforms in order to avoid misunderstandings. Urgent efforts must be made to improve the identification of uniforms and vehicles when the latter resemble army units’, by providing additional and temporary identification, such as highly visible arm bands or badges and vehicle stripes or stickers. Identification marks will be systematically applied and colors will be mutually agreed.

Page 3, Final Article
Both sides endeavor to negotiate with the Russian side mechanisms for transparency (exchange of information) and incident reporting.
Crime/organised crime: No specific mention.
Drugs: No specific mention.
Terrorism: No specific mention.

Transitional justice

Transitional justice general: No specific mention.
Amnesty/pardon: No specific mention.
Courts: No specific mention.
Mechanism: No specific mention.
Prisoner release: No specific mention.
Vetting: No specific mention.
Victims: No specific mention.
Missing persons: No specific mention.
Reparations: No specific mention.
Reconciliation: No specific mention.

Implementation

UN signatory: No specific mention.
Other international signatory: Head of EU Monitoring Mission Ambassador Hansjorg Haber
Referendum for agreement: No specific mention.
International mission/force/similar: No specific mention.
Enforcement mechanism: No specific mention.
Related cases: No specific mention.
Source: (Archive of the EUMM in Georgia) Source: www.rrc.ge/law/MorigebebOrive_10_10_2008_E.htm

The Provisional Mechanism for the Prevention and Settlement of Disputes -

TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia and the Head of Mission of the European Union Monitoring Mission

This arrangement establishes a cooperative and consultative mechanism for the prevention and resolution of disputes.

The mechanism should provide assurances of stability through information and consultation based on the following principles:

Stabilisation:

- Withdrawal of Russian forces;

- Absence of Georgian armed forces from zones adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia;

- Regulation of the presence (if any) of special Georgian police units and prevention of irregular armed groups.

Normalisation:

- Return of regular Georgian police to the area;

- Return of the rule of law;

- Return of civilian administration;

- Return of IDPs

- Engagement of international aid agencies.

Exchange of Information and Dispute Settlement:

The mechanism will consist of a system of consultations at three levels:

1. At the operational level, mechanisms for regular consultations (at least on a weekly basis).

This mechanism will include representatives of the so called de facto authorities;

2. At EUMM Head of Mission, Georgian Ministry of Interior level and equivalent Russian counterpart, a mechanism for dealing with transparency, major incidents and disputes.

3. A political level for dispute settlement, possibly at the level of MFA of Georgia, Russia and Secretary General/ High Representative of the EU.

Furthermore, in implementing point 1 above, at the operational level, the establishment is foreseen of two local commissions including the Russian side:

1. Zugdidi/Gali

2. Tskhinvali/Gori

Meetings of these two commissions would be held on at least a weekly basis and in response to needs arising from the situation on the ground.

Mechanisms at the Operational level:

Both sides agree that the prevention and resolution of conflicts will depend on high level of transparency, to be provided by all sides, as a condition for confidence building measures.

It is understood that EUMM will seek transparency on both sides.

In this context, the following is agreed.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) will inform the EUMM of any forces that it plans to deploy in the zones adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (hereafter referred to as “the areas”), during and following the withdrawal of Russian forces and also on police forces that are already in the areas under Georgian control.

More specifically, MoIA will provide a detailed breakdown of the number of forces for the different locations, including the type of weaponry these police forces have available.

This information will cover regular police forces as well as special police forces.

The MoIA will also provide information to EUMM about any armed irregulars in the areas.

It is understood that the armed forces of Georgia, which are under the MoD, will not deploy to the areas.

Transparency and predictability will be provided by the MoIA, including through a clear policy of visibility with respect to the uniforms, vehicles and other equipment used by the various police forces.

Regular police, including Criminal Investigation Department as well as Special police, will have clearly distinguishable uniforms in order to avoid misunderstandings.

Urgent efforts must be made to improve the identification of uniforms and vehicles when the latter resemble army units’, by providing additional and temporary identification, such as highly visible arm bands or badges and vehicle stripes or stickers.

Identification marks will be systematically applied and colors will be mutually agreed.

The MoIA commits not to deploy heavy armaments in the areas, not any mortars.

The MoIA also commits to strictly control and restrict any deployment of sniper rifles.

Sniper rifles will be kept in police offices and may be deployed in the field only in reaction to a direct attack.

The MoIA recognizes the EUMM’s right to perform unannounced inspections on these matters and will inform the police forces of this disposition.

The MoIA will inform EUMM in advance of any deployment of armed vehicles (in particular Cobras) in the direction of and into the areas.

The MoIA will inform EUMM of any arrangements made with the Russian side on security matters, including transit and movement of forces and equipment.

Incident Reporting

EUMM and MoIA agree to set up an incident reporting mechanism.

In particular, the MoIA will instruct its police forces to report any incident threatening or involving the use of arms to a central point of contact in the MoIA (POC).

This POC will report the incident immediately to

EUMM Liaison Officer in the MoIA.

EUMM Liaison Officer will similarly report on incidents to MoIA POC.

Final Article

Both sides endeavor to negotiate with the Russian side mechanisms for transparency (exchange of information) and incident reporting.

Signed on October 10, 2008 by:

Head of EU Monitoring Mission Ambassador Hansjorg Haber Minister of Interior of the Government of Georgia Ivane Merabishvili