Agreement on strengthening the ceasefire

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Country/entity: Armenia
Azerbaijan
Nagorno-Karabakh
Region: Europe and Eurasia
Agreement name: Agreement on strengthening the ceasefire
Date: 4 Feb 1995
Agreement status: Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement: Yes
Agreement/conflict level: Interstate/intrastate conflict(s)
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1991 - )
The territory of Nagorno-Karabakh has been a long-standing object of dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. During the existence of USSR, the territory was assigned to Azerbaijan, starting in 1921. After decades of disagreements over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and in the wake of Gorbachev’s policies of political openness, the protests by Armenians in the region escalated into violent conflict in 1990, exacerbated by the central government’s inability to control the republics as the USSR itself was on the verge of collapse. The Autonomous Region (Oblast) of Nagorno-Karabakh (NKAO) proclaimed independence from Azerbaijan in 1991, after the Parliament of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic voted to abolish the Oblast. The territory itself is populated by ethnic Armenians, but surrounded by territories with an Azeri majority. The territory proclaimed independence, with the support of Armenia, and incorporating the areas that surround it, but has never gained international recognition and remains a de jure part of Azerbaijan. The violence intensified , leading to an estimated overall death toll of 30 000 After several attempts at mediation, the opposing sides agreed to a ceasefire in May 1994, but the situation has not been resolved to date and the violence had briefly resumed in the spring of 2016. The initial ceasefire in 1994 was the outcome of the so-called “Minsk process”, overseen by OSCE, with the participation of Russia, France, and the US.
Stage: Ceasefire/related
Conflict nature: Government/territory
Peace process: Armenia-Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh: Process 1990s
Parties: M. MAMEDOV
Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan

Serge Sargsyan
Minister of Defence of Armenia

Samvel Babayan
Commander of the Army of Nagorno Karabakh
Third parties: Vladimir Kazimirov
on behalf of the Co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Conference
Description: This agreement details provisions to strengthen the Bishkek ceasefire regime. The agreement was drawn up as a series of letters: 1 sent out to the parties by the Russian mediator on behalf of the Minsk conference chairmen with the proposals for strengthening the ceasefire, followed by 3 identical reply letters from the parties confirming their acceptance of the terms of the agreement.

Agreement document: AM_AZ_950205_agreement on strenghening the ceasefire.pdf (opens in new tab) | Download PDF

Groups

Children/youth: No specific mention.
Disabled persons: No specific mention.
Elderly/age: No specific mention.
Migrant workers: No specific mention.
Racial/ethnic/national group: No specific mention.
Religious groups: No specific mention.
Indigenous people: No specific mention.
Other groups: No specific mention.
Refugees/displaced persons: No specific mention.
Social class: No specific mention.

Gender

Women, girls and gender: No specific mention.
Men and boys: No specific mention.
LGBTI: No specific mention.
Family: No specific mention.

State definition

Nature of state (general): No specific mention.
State configuration: No specific mention.
Self determination: No specific mention.
Referendum: No specific mention.
State symbols: No specific mention.
Independence/secession: No specific mention.
Accession/unification: No specific mention.
Border delimitation: No specific mention.
Cross-border provision: No specific mention.

Governance

Political institutions (new or reformed): No specific mention.
Elections: No specific mention.
Electoral commission: No specific mention.
Political parties reform: No specific mention.
Civil society: No specific mention.
Traditional/religious leaders: No specific mention.
Public administration: No specific mention.
Constitution: No specific mention.

Power sharing

Political power sharing: No specific mention.
Territorial power sharing: No specific mention.
Economic power sharing: No specific mention.
Military power sharing: No specific mention.

Human rights and equality

Human rights/RoL general: No specific mention.
Bill of rights/similar: No specific mention.
Treaty incorporation: No specific mention.
Civil and political rights: No specific mention.
Socio-economic rights: No specific mention.

Rights related issues

Citizenship: No specific mention.
Democracy: No specific mention.
Detention procedures: No specific mention.
Media and communication: Rights related issues→Media and communication→Other
Page 1, 1: In the event of incidents threatening the ceasefire, to immediately inform the other Side (and in a copy – the Mediator) in written form by facsimile or by the PM line with an exact specification of the place, time and character of the incident and its consequences.
The other Side is informed that measures are being taken for non-admission of reciprocal actions which could lead to the aggravation of the incident. Accordingly, the other Side is expected to take appropriate measures immediately. If possible, proposals about taking urgent measures to overcome this incident as quickly as possible and restore the status quo ante are also reported.

Page 1, 2: Upon receiving such a notification from the other Side, to immediately check the facts and give a written response not later than within 6 hours (in a copy – to the Mediator).

Page 1, 3: The Sides agree that official sources will inform the mass media about the incident only after receiving the response from the other Side and if this response is delayed then not earlier than 7 hours after the transference of the initial address on a given issue to the other Side. At the same time, the Sides will objectively reflect the response of the other Side in the report for the press as well as notify that contacts on a given issue are continuing.

Page 1, 4: With a view to establish a reliable direct urgent communication each Side allocates two PM devices and ensures 24-hour duty of responsible officials at both devices. The corresponding numbers of the PM devices must be reported via the Mediator not later than February 6, 1995.
If it is impossible to use fax for sending urgent reports by the Sides to each other or to the Mediator corresponding texts are dictated by the PM communication line.

Page 2, 10: The Sides are obliged to refrain from public statements that can lead to the escalation of the conflict.
Mobility/access: No specific mention.
Protection measures: No specific mention.
Other: No specific mention.

Rights institutions

NHRI: No specific mention.
Regional or international human rights institutions: No specific mention.

Justice sector reform

Criminal justice and emergency law: No specific mention.
State of emergency provisions: No specific mention.
Judiciary and courts: No specific mention.
Prisons and detention: No specific mention.
Traditional Laws: No specific mention.

Socio-economic reconstruction

Development or socio-economic reconstruction: No specific mention.
National economic plan: No specific mention.
Natural resources: No specific mention.
International funds: No specific mention.
Business: No specific mention.
Taxation: No specific mention.
Banks: No specific mention.

Land, property and environment

Land reform/rights: No specific mention.
Pastoralist/nomadism rights: No specific mention.
Cultural heritage: No specific mention.
Environment: No specific mention.
Water or riparian rights or access: No specific mention.

Security sector

Security Guarantees: No specific mention.
Ceasefire: Security sector→Ceasefire→Ceasefire provision
[Summary: The entire agreement details measures to strengthen the permanent Bishkek Ceasefire of 12/05/94.]

Page 1, 1: In the event of incidents threatening the ceasefire, to immediately inform the other Side (and in a copy – the Mediator) in written form by facsimile or by the PM line with an exact specification of the place, time and character of the incident and its consequences.
The other Side is informed that measures are being taken for non-admission of reciprocal actions which could lead to the aggravation of the incident. Accordingly, the other Side is expected to take appropriate measures immediately. If possible, proposals about taking urgent measures to overcome this incident as quickly as possible and restore the status quo ante are also reported.

Page 1, 2: Upon receiving such a notification from the other Side, to immediately check the facts and give a written response not later than within 6 hours (in a copy – to the Mediator).
Police: No specific mention.
Armed forces: No specific mention.
DDR: No specific mention.
Intelligence services: No specific mention.
Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces: No specific mention.
Withdrawal of foreign forces: No specific mention.
Corruption: No specific mention.
Crime/organised crime: No specific mention.
Drugs: No specific mention.
Terrorism: No specific mention.

Transitional justice

Transitional justice general: No specific mention.
Amnesty/pardon: No specific mention.
Courts: No specific mention.
Mechanism: No specific mention.
Prisoner release: No specific mention.
Vetting: No specific mention.
Victims: No specific mention.
Missing persons: No specific mention.
Reparations: No specific mention.
Reconciliation: No specific mention.

Implementation

UN signatory: No specific mention.
Other international signatory: As a third-party mediator:
Vladimir Kazimirov
on behalf of the Co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Conference
Referendum for agreement: No specific mention.
International mission/force/similar: No specific mention.
Enforcement mechanism: Page 1, 5: The Sides agree that the Mediator will take into consideration only those addresses of the Sides in which it is proved that a given issue has already been raised before the other Side.

Page 1, 6: In special cases the Sides may ask the Mediator to hold an urgent meeting with their representatives with a view to examine the incident and the formed situation.

Page 1, 7: If necessary, by the petition of one of the Sides and with the consent of the other Side a mixed group of inspectors including, if the Sides asks about it, representatives of the Mediator may be dispatched to investigate the situation on the spot.

Page 2, 8: Without waiting for the completion of the investigation of the incident the Sides are obliged to take measures to prevent the escalation with the purpose of restoring the status quo ante, at the same time maximally taking into consideration the possible recommendations of the Mediator.

Page 2, 9: Depending on the severity of the situation, it may be submitted by the Mediator for investigation at a meeting of the OSCE Minsk Group or at the OSCE Permanent Council.
Related cases: No specific mention.
Source: ALI ABASOV, HAROUTIUN KHACHATRIAN, THE KARABAKH CONFLICT Variants of settlement: Concepts and reality
Third edition, revised and updated, Baku-Yerevan, 2006. Available from: http://www.ca-c.org

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC Mr. HEYDAR ALIYEV*

Dear Heydar Aliyevich,

According to the exchange of views on the issues of strengthening the ceasefire regime, which took place in Baku, I am sending to you, as it was agreed, the proposals of the Minsk Conference co-chairmen.

The proposals of the mediator on strengthening the ceasefire in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict

On behalf of the Co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Conference (hereinafter – the Mediator), with the purpose of strengthening the ceasefire regime established in the conflict region since May 12, 1994 and creating more favourable conditions for the progress of the peace process, we jointly suggest that the conflicting sides (hereinafter – the Sides) should assume the following obligations:

1. In the event of incidents threatening the ceasefire, to immediately inform the other Side (and in a copy – the Mediator) in written form by facsimile or by the PM line with an exact specification of the place, time and character of the incident and its consequences.

The other Side is informed that measures are being taken for non-admission of reciprocal actions which could lead to the aggravation of the incident.

Accordingly, the other Side is expected to take appropriate measures immediately.

If possible, proposals about taking urgent measures to overcome this incident as quickly as possible and restore the status quo ante are also reported.

2. Upon receiving such a notification from the other Side, to immediately check the facts and give a written response not later than within 6 hours (in a copy – to the Mediator).

3. The Sides agree that official sources will inform the mass media about the incident only after receiving the response from the other Side and if this response is delayed then not earlier than 7 hours after the transference of the initial address on a given issue to the other Side.

At the same time, the Sides will objectively reflect the response of the other Side in the report for the press as well as notify that contacts on a given issue are continuing.

4. With a view to establish a reliable direct urgent communication each Side allocates two PM devices and ensures 24-hour duty of responsible officials at both devices.

The corresponding numbers of the PM devices must be reported via the Mediator not later than February 6, 1995.

If it is impossible to use fax for sending urgent reports by the Sides to each other or to the Mediator corresponding texts are dictated by the PM communication line.

5. The Sides agree that the Mediator will take into consideration only those addresses of the Sides in which it is proved that a given issue has already been raised before the other Side.

6. In special cases the Sides may ask the Mediator to hold an urgent meeting with their representatives with a view to examine the incident and the formed situation.

7. If necessary, by the petition of one of the Sides and with the consent of the other Side a mixed group of inspectors including, if the Sides asks about it, representatives of the Mediator may be dispatched to investigate the situation on the spot.

8. Without waiting for the completion of the investigation of the incident the Sides are obliged to take measures to prevent the escalation with the purpose of restoring the status quo ante, at the same time maximally taking into consideration the possible recommendations of the Mediator.

9. Depending on the severity of the situation, it may be submitted by the Mediator for investigation at a meeting of the OSCE Minsk Group or at the OSCE Permanent Council.

10. The Sides are obliged to refrain from public statements that can lead to the escalation of the conflict.

We ask to confirm officially the readiness to assume the aforementioned obligations in full measure at the level of the top military leadership no later than on February 4, 1995 in order to consider, after receiving an appropriate response from the Sides, these obligations as effective beginning on February 6, 1995.

Vladimir Kazimirov

on behalf of the Co-chairmen

of the OSCE Minsk Conference

3 February, 1995

________________________________________

Attached:

The proposal on the text of the response.

The Co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Conference

To Ambassador V. N. Kazimirov To Ambassador A. Burner

I confirm the readiness of Azerbaijan to assume the obligations stated by you in your proposal of February 3, 1995 in full measure.

In case of receiving your confirmation about the general consent to these obligations, we will consider this agreement as effective beginning on February 6, 1995.

M. MAMEDOV

Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan

4 February, 1995

Note:

On the same day, February 3, 1995, similar letters were sent to President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan and leader of Nagorno Karabakh Robert Kocharyan.

On February 4, 1995, the same day when the letter of Mamedov was received, reply letters were received (identical with the one cited above) from Armenia’s Minister of Defence Serge Sargsyan and Commander of the Army of Nagorno Karabakh Samvel Babayan.